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In the eighteen months since it came down, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion1 has variously been described as a “watershed,”2 a “game-changer,”3 
and perhaps even “[t]he most significant”4 case of the Court’s 2010 Term. I share this assessment, 
but not for the familiar reasons. In my view, Concepcion is significant not so much because of 
what it portends for the future of aggregate litigation or the ability of small-dollar plaintiffs to 
                                                     
 Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I thank Jennifer Brown, Michael Helfand, David 
Horton, and participants at both the Yale/Quinnipiac Dispute Resolution Workshop held at Yale Law School in 
November 2011, and the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law symposium on U.S. Arbitration Law 
in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, for invaluable feedback. I am also grateful to Jaime Bourns, David 
Doeling, and Harbik Gharabagi for their superb research assistance, and to Nick Fox for his editorial skill and 
judgment. 
1 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
2 Richard C. Reuben, FAA Law, Without the Activism: What if the Bellwether Cases Were Decided By a Truly 
Conservative Court?, 60 KAN. L. REV. 883, 894 (2012). 
3 Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 75 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 120 (2012). 
4 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Weighs Class Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/business/10bizcourt.html?_r=1&ref=adam_liptak; Debra Cassens Weiss, The End 
of Consumer Class Actions? Supreme Court Upholds AT&T Arbitration Contract, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 27, 2011, 9:29 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_end_of_consumer_class_actions_supreme_court_upholds_att_arbitration_
con/; Paula M. Weber, From Hire to Fire: Contracts During the Employment Relationship, 1924 PLI/CORP 309 (2012). 
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redress systematic wrongdoing by large-scale defendants,5 but because it signals something of a 
paradigm shift in the law of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)6 preemption.  
Because the facts of Concepcion are now well known, I recite only those details relevant 
to my argument: The Concepcions signed up for AT&T service, which AT&T advertised as 
coming with a free phone. Although they received the free phone, the Concepcions were charged 
an additional $30.22 in sales tax based on the phone’s retail value, so they filed a putative class 
action against AT&T for fraud and false advertising. When AT&T moved to compel arbitration 
pursuant to a clause in its customer agreement, the Concepcions argued that the clause was 
unconscionable under a 2005 precedent from the California Supreme Court by the name of 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court.7 Discover Bank held that collective action waivers (whether in 
arbitration or litigation) are presumptively unconscionable when they are  
found in [1] a consumer contract of adhesion [2] in a setting in which 
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and [3] when it is alleged that the party with the 
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately 
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money.8 
The district court and the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Concepcions and, moreover, held that 
Discover Bank was not preempted by the FAA. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed these lower 
court preemption holdings.  
This Article proceeds as follows. I begin Part I with what I think of as the puzzle of 
Concepcion: Notwithstanding the majority’s declarations to the contrary, Concepcion represents a 
significant break from the traditional justifications offered for FAA preemption of state law. 
What, then, is the explanation for the Court’s decision to preempt Discover Bank? In Part II, I 
offer an answer: Concepcion turns on what I have elsewhere described as an antidiscrimination 
theory of FAA preemption. Understanding how that theory plays out both in the majority’s 
decision and in the parties’ briefing of the issues will, I argue, help account for many aspects of 
the opinion that have so far been left unexplained.  
To say that Concepcion is animated by an antidiscrimination theory of the FAA does not, 
however, imply anything about the nature of that theory or whether the Court got it correct. In 
Part III, I demonstrate that even though the theory has routinely been invoked over the past three 
decades to legitimize the FAA’s displacement of state law, it remains vastly underdeveloped and 
poorly understood. From this point of view, the problem with Concepcion is less that a majority 
of the Court decided the case based on ideology or policy preferences, as many have argued,9 and 
more that the lack of any clear standards or limits to the antidiscrimination theory leaves the 
                                                     
5 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012); James Vicini, Supreme Court Rules for AT&T in Arbitration Case, 
REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-att-arbitration-
idUSTRE73Q4N520110427. 
6 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2009). 
7 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
8 Id. at 1110. 
9 In any event, this is arguably true of most cases decided by the High Court. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert 
D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). 
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theory prone to abuse in whichever direction the wind happens to blow. In Part IV, I draw on the 
collective learning in the antidiscrimination area to critique the Court’s opinion and to suggest 
that, with a more sophisticated understanding of what it means to discriminate against arbitration, 
the result in Concepcion would and should have been very different. 
I. THE PUZZLE OF CONCEPCION 
To understand the puzzle at the core of Concepcion, it will be necessary first to review 
the law of FAA preemption. FAA preemption is a species of conflict preemption, pursuant to 
which state law will be displaced if and only if it somehow conflicts with or “stands as an 
obstacle” to the text or purpose of a federal statute.10  
The text of FAA section 2 provides that a “[1] written provision . . . to submit [specified 
disputes] to arbitration . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, [2] save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”11 The first clause of 
section 2 has generally been understood as a mandate to “rigorously enforce”12 arbitration 
agreements “according to their terms.”13 Following Richard Nagareda, I refer to this as the 
“command clause.”14 Any state law that stands as an obstacle to the command clause will be 
preempted by the FAA. For example, where the parties’ agreement contains an agreement to 
arbitrate any and all disputes, a state law that prohibits the arbitration of wage disputes will be 
preempted because it prevents enforcement of the agreement strictly as written.15 
The second clause of section 2 contains the only exceptions to the command clause thus 
far recognized by the Court. This so-called “savings clause” has widely been understood as 
allowing states to regulate arbitration agreements so long as they do so using “generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”16 As the Court put it, 
“if [a state] law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of 
contracts generally,” then the law is not preempted.17 Applications of the unconscionability 
defense to invalidate arbitration clauses have for this reason almost uniformly avoided 
preemption, even when the application is alleged to “single out” arbitration agreements for 
unfavorable treatment.18 
                                                     
10 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
67 (1941)).  
11 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009). Section 2 is the only provision of the FAA that the Court has used to preempt state law. 
See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006). 
12 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). 
13 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989). The injunction 
to enforce arbitration agreements to the letter effectively means that arbitration clauses must be enforced 
“notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
14 See Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1069, 1075–76 (2011). 
15 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
16 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (citation omitted). 
17 Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
18 See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1287–88 (2011). 
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As part of California’s common law of unconscionability, Discover Bank fell within the 
savings clause and for this reason should have been spared from preemption according to the 
principles outlined above. But the Court did just the opposite. Concepcion therefore violates 
much of what we thought we knew about the interaction between the command and savings 
clauses.  
To be sure, conflict preemption is not limited to situations in which the state law collides 
head-on with the plain language of a federal statute; it also covers situations in which the state 
law is consistent with the statutory text but nonetheless frustrates the text’s “‘purposes and 
objectives.’”19 Concepcion might, therefore, be understood as making this type of determination 
about Discover Bank. To see whether this is the case, we must first come to grips with the 
purposes and objectives behind section 2’s command and savings clauses.  
Perhaps the leading view is that those clauses, and the FAA more generally, seek to 
honor arbitration agreements qua contracts.20 “Arbitration agreements are purely matters of 
contract, and the effect of the [FAA] is simply to make the contracting party live up to his 
agreement.”21 State laws are accordingly preempted when they undermine the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements. I refer to this as the “contract theory.” Another view, which might be 
referred to as the “favoritism theory,” holds that state laws are preempted if they disfavor 
arbitration or arbitration agreements. Most commentators (both critical and supportive of the 
opinion) appear to believe that Concepcion can be squared with one or both of these purposes and 
objectives.22  
I begin this Article with the following bold claim: Concepcion cannot be explained on 
either the contract or the favoritism theories. If I am correct, the basic puzzle of Concepcion 
comes into focus: What is the real reason why the Court held Discover Bank preempted? 
Otherwise stated, to what purpose or objective of the FAA did the Court believe Discover Bank 
stood as an obstacle?  
A. The Twilight of Contract 
Prior to the enactment of the FAA in 1925, it was virtually impossible to compel 
arbitration of disputes. The traditional explanation is that early common law courts, jealous of 
competition from private adjudicative forums, had devised artificial rules that thwarted the 
enforcement of promises to arbitrate for no apparent reason other than an “irrational,” “unjust,” 
and “anachronis[tic]” hostility toward the arbitral process.23  
                                                     
19 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941)). 
20 See Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32. 
21 GEORGE S. GRAHAM, TO VALIDATE CERTAIN AGREEMENTS FOR ARBITRATION, H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924).  
22 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: How the Supreme 
Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 144–45 (2012); Craig Hoover et al., Supreme 
Court Rules that Arbitration Agreements Can Foreclose Classwide Arbitration Proceedings, MONDAQ (May 4, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/131144/Arbitration+Dispute+Resolution/Supreme+Court+Rules+That+Arbitrat
ion+Agreements+Can+Foreclose+Classwide+Arbitration+Procedures. 
23 Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1253. 
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On the contract theory, the “basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act [was] to 
overcome [these] refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”24 The rationale is that there is little 
defensible basis for enforcing an arbitration agreement with less determination than any other 
contract.25 This is why arbitration agrements may be regulated only through rules that “arose to 
govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally”26—
not through rules like the old common law ouster and revocability doctrines that applied only to 
arbitration agreements.27 Thus, “[s]uccessful challenges to arbitration [agreements] must find 
their basis in contract law, not some other source of law” like employment or consumer 
protection law.28 Consistent with the contract theory, the district court and the Ninth Circuit in 
Concepcion reasoned that Discover Bank avoided preemption because it was nothing more than a 
judicial precedent for the application of the common law unconscionability defense.29  
But the Court reached the opposite conclusion. It held that Discover Bank conflicted with 
section 2’s “overarching purpose to ‘ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according 
to their terms.’”30 Although this may sound consistent with the contract theory, on closer 
inspection it is not. The only way to square the Court’s conclusion with the contract view is if the 
Discover Bank rule somehow does not qualify as a generally applicable contract defense—for 
example, because it is a rogue version of unconscionability otherwise unknown to the common 
law of contracts. During briefing on certiorari and on the merits, AT&T and its amici pressed this 
very point, arguing that the California rule was a “distortion” that “b[ore] no resemblance” to 
traditional unconscionability law.31  
This argument did not win the day, however. It was rejected in no uncertain terms by 
justices on both sides of the aisle during oral argument,32 and it was also quietly dismissed in the 
Court’s opinion. After noting that general unconscionability requires both a procedural and a 
substantive element, for instance, the majority concluded that Discover Bank had in fact “applied 
                                                     
24 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. 
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 
25 See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 28, 51–52 (1918).  
26 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
27 See generally Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 YALE L.J. 
147 (1921) (describing ouster and revocability doctrines).  
28 See STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 738 (2001); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for 
Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements–With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. 
AM. ARB. 251, 265 (2006); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a 
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 195 (1998). 
29 See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom., AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Laster v. T-Mobile U.S.A., Inc., No. 05–CV–1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at 
**7–8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008). 
30 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. 
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
31 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25–26, 31, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) 
(No. 09–893); Brief for Petitioner at 18, 32, 47, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09–893). See generally Brief Amici 
Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09–893) (arguing 
that California courts have “distorted” traditional common law unconscionability principles beyond recognition); Brief 
of DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 
09–893) (arguing that Discover Bank “departs” from traditional unconscionability doctrine). 
32 See infra notes 152–153 and accompanying text.  
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this framework” fair and square to class action waivers.33 Indeed, any other conclusion would 
have put the Court in the deeply problematic posture of accusing the final arbiter of California 
law of misapprehending its own doctrine of unconscionability when it decided Discover Bank. 
The Court therefore had little choice but to accept Discover Bank as a bona fide principle of state 
contract law.  
Concepcion therefore amounts to the proposition that a perfectly valid application of a 
generally applicable contract doctrine is nonetheless preempted by the FAA.34 This is evident in 
Justice Scalia’s remark that “[a]lthough § 2’s savings clause preserves generally applicable 
contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”35 In other words, it is possible for a 
state-law rule to frustrate the FAA even if it counts as generally applicable.  
This is a complete and substantial break from the contract theory. If there was one thing 
that had seemed settled, it was that the FAA’s commitment to arbitration as a creature of contract 
meant that arbitration agreements would be made “enforceable as other contracts, but not more 
so.”36 Concepcion changed all of that overnight.37 If FAA preemption no longer turns on whether 
the state law is a genuine contract law defense, the contract paradigm cannot fully explain FAA 
preemption after Concepcion. A fortiori, it no longer captures the purposes and objectives of the 
FAA in quite the same way it did before. Something else, therefore, must be at work.  
Here it is often retorted that Concepcion is perfectly consistent with the contract theory 
because the Court enforced the collective action waiver in AT&T’s customer agreement strictly 
according to its terms, Discover Bank notwithstanding.38 The problem with this retort is that it 
confuses the contract paradigm with one based on freedom of contract. The Court’s decision 
might well be described as consistent with freedom of contract insofar as it displaced a state rule 
that limited the parties’ prerogative to “structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”39 
But that is not the same as the contract theory’s emphasis on “bring[ing] private contractual 
arbitration agreements into general contract law”40—that is, on holding arbitration contracts to the 
same requirements of validity and enforceability imposed on other contracts. Far from 
synonymous with the ideal of unbridled private autonomy, contract law represents a continuing 
endeavor to balance that ideal against the protection of public values. This is why, as far back as 
the classical period, the common law singled out a variety of contracts and contract provisions for 
                                                     
33 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746; see also Phillip M. Lax, Collective Action Waivers in Labor Law: Why They 
are Unenforceable Even After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 11 (Mar. 7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017950.  
34 See, e.g., Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (observing that 
Concepcion “characterize[d]” the Discover Bank standard “as arising from the ‘generally applicable’ contract law 
doctrine of unconscionability”).  
35 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.  
36 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (emphasis added). 
37 Accord Cunningham, supra note 22, at 144–45 (arguing that, if Concepcion had been faithful to contract 
principles, it would have struck AT&T’s class waiver consistent with state contract law). 
38 See, e.g., Andrew McBride & Thomas McCarthy, Supreme Court Observations: AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, THE LEGAL PULSE (Apr. 29, 2011), http://wlflegalpulse.com/2011/04/29/supreme-court-observations-att-
mobility-v-concepcion/. 
39 Volt, 489 U.S at 479.   
40 David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act's 
Encroachment on State Law, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 137–38 (2004) (emphasis added). 
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regulation in the public interest.41 Even during the height of the Lochner era, courts never 
pretended to enforce contracts exactly as written.42  
Moreover, it is not even clear that Concepcion is consistent with freedom of contract. 
Many would argue that consumers are not in any real sense “free” when they acquiesce to terms 
contained in adhesion contracts like AT&T’s service agreement.43 If so, preempting Discover 
Bank would seem to exacerbate rather than mitigate this unfreedom. It is also doubtful whether a 
law such as Discover Bank can be understood as reducing liberty of contract simply because it 
interferes with the parties’ agreement as written, and thus whether displacing Discover Bank 
tends to increase that liberty.44 For example, would we consider contracting parties to be freer if 
the state held them to an agreement that had been procured by fraud or duress?45 An agreement 
that turns out to be impracticable? Or one that lacks consideration? The lesson here is that 
common law defenses such as unconscionability can do just as much to augment freedom of 
contract as they can to diminish it. Taken to its logical terminus, the retort leads to the untenable 
proposition that contracts should be enforced just for the sake of enforcement, no matter what 
their effect on other values such as voluntary consent, procedural fairness, or the reasonable 
expectations of the parties.  
B. The Twilight of Favoritism 
A discussion of the favoritism theory cannot proceed without resolving a threshold 
question about the supposed object of favoritism: Does the FAA seek to favor arbitration or 
arbitration agreements? The Court has used both formulations interchangeably,46 which in turn 
enables lower courts to exploit the indeterminacy to justify FAA preemption outcomes based on 
policy rather than principle. To be sure, it is entirely possible to favor both the arbitration process 
                                                     
41 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of Freedom of Contract in the Age of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, in 
THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 103, 103, 108 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of 
Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 482–86 (1909); Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 373 (1921) 
(noting that English courts before the 19th century refused to enforce a variety of contracts contrary to public policy). 
42 See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 448–49 (1993). 
43 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for 
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 675–77 (1996). 
44 See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 315 (1975) 
(“Properly understood, [freedom of contract] does not require a court to enforce every contract brought before it.”). 
45 Richard Epstein, among others, has argued that economic duress, nondisclosure, the statute of frauds, and 
certain applications of the doctrine of capacity are not in fact consistent with the freedom of contract ideal. See id. at 
297–302. This would suggest that many general contract defenses currently presumed to fall within the savings clause 
might become problematic if freedom of contract were taken to be the touchstone for FAA preemption. 
46 The lack of precision here is truly astounding. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 
490 U.S. 477, 479–81 (1989) (noting the FAA’s policy of “strongly favor[ing] the enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate” and later referring to favoritism of “arbitration proceedings” as a “method of resolving disputes”); Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625, 630 (1985) (explaining that the “‘liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements’ . . . is at bottom a policy guaranteeing enforcement of private contractual 
arrangements” and then relying on the “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution”); Moses H. Cone 
Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting at once that Section 2 embodies a “liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements” and that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for 
the federal policy favoring arbitration.”).  
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and the agreements that give rise to it. Nonetheless, I shall argue that the best interpretation of the 
theory is that federal arbitration law seeks to favor arbitration qua process, not qua contract. 
There are at least three reasons why.  
First, one of the main objectives of the FAA was to overturn the old “revocability” 
doctrine,47 which allowed a reluctant party to revoke her promise to arbitrate existing or future 
disputes at any time prior to issuance of the award. Revocability does not go to the question of 
whether the arbitration agreement is valid or enforceable, because the non-revoking party was 
always entitled to money damages for breach.48 Instead, because the right of revocation simply 
prevents a court from ordering specific performance of the promise to arbitrate, revocability goes 
only to the question of remedy—whether a court may compel resort to the arbitration process.49 A 
significant part of the FAA’s charge, therefore, was the vindication of arbitration as a process 
rather than a promise.  
Second, favoring arbitration agreements is better understood as a means to an end rather 
than an end in itself.50 If arbitration agreements were ends in themselves, there would be little 
more for the FAA to do beyond reversing the old ouster doctrine, which made pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements void. The validity of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement could then be 
enforced by the award of money damages without so much as a single arbitration proceeding ever 
taking place.51 But the FAA does so much more: Among other things, it creates procedures for 
compelling arbitration, for staying or barring related litigation, for appointing arbitrators and 
conducting hearings, for enforcing arbitral awards as court judgments, and for vacating and 
                                                     
47 This is one of the chief reasons why the command clause makes arbitration clauses falling within its purview 
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009) (emphasis added); see Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 
of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847, 854–
56 (1960). The other reason was to overturn the ouster doctrine. See infra note 49. 
48 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 
20 (1992) (adding that money damages were typically nominal); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: 
Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 973 (1999). 
49 By contrast, the ouster doctrine went to the question of validity, although apparently only to the validity of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements. See Scott v. Avery, [1856] 10 Eng. Rep. 1135, 1138 (H.L.); Charles Newton Hulvey, 
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, 15 VA. L. REV. 238, 238 (1929); Note, supra note 47, at 854 n.46. Post-dispute 
arbitration agreements were considered perfectly valid, even though the revocability doctrine could still be invoked to 
deny specific performance. Thus, pre-FAA law allowed a court to compel the enforcement of some arbitration 
agreements (namely, post-dispute arbitration agreements, through the remedy of money damages), but never to compel 
the arbitration process.  
50 Although they might agree in the final analysis, most judges and commentators remain confused about this 
basic point. See Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1238–39 (2011); Brief of 
Arbitration Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14–18, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (No. 09–893). A notable exception is Justice Stevens, who demonstrated a particularly lucid 
understanding of the means-ends distinction in his dissenting opinion in Hall Street Associates., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 
552 U.S. 576 (2008). There, he reasoned that “American courts were generally hostile to arbitration. They refused, 
with rare exceptions, to order specific enforcement of executory agreements arbitrate. Section 2 of the FAA responded 
to this hostility by making written arbitration agreements ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.’” Id. at 593 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
51 Whether the agreement is enforced by specific performance or money damages is not, after all, an issue of 
enforcement or validity but one of remedy. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 293–94 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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modifying such awards.52 The FAA’s true object of concern, therefore, is not so much the 
agreement itself as the process that the agreement makes possible.53  
Third, it is difficult to appreciate what it means to favor arbitration agreements other than 
eliminating needless impediments to their enforcement.54 But if so, this begins to sound much like 
the contract theory’s emphasis on “rigorously enforc[ing]” such agreements. To avoid 
redundancy, therefore, the favoritism theory is best interpreted as directed toward the arbitration 
process.  
If the foregoing is correct, Concepcion is anything but favorable to arbitration. As many 
of us have already noted,55 the opinion is infected to the core with the very same limiting beliefs 
about arbitration that the Court has spent the better part of three decades attempting to debunk. 
“Arbitration,” the majority declared, “is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.”56 
“Arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of 
certification,” so that it is “at the very least odd to think that an arbitrator would be entrusted with 
ensuring that third parties’ due process rights are satisfied.”57 Unlike the de novo review of class 
certification questions available in court, arbitrators’ class certification decisions are not 
appealable.58 And although the resulting award is subject to the FAA’s vacatur standards, those 
standards amount to “no effective means of review.”59  
In an early line of cases, the Court used similar uncharitable assessments about arbitration 
to undo valid, broadly-worded arbitration agreements.60 Thus, in holding that a claim under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)61 was nonarbitrable, the Court held that:  
                                                     
52 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–7, 9–11 (2009). 
53 See STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 33 (2d ed. 2007) (“Central to the 
FAA is its requirement that courts enforce arbitration agreements with the remedy of specific performance.”). In the 
same vein, even critics argue that the real motivation behind the Court’s FAA jurisprudence is to secure an alternative 
forum to help alleviate crowded court dockets. See, e.g., Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme 
Court's Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 830 
(2002); Sternlight, supra note 43, at 661.  
54 Accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (defining the “liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” as “at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private 
contractual arrangements . . . .”).  
55 See Ian D. Mitchell & Richard Bales, Concepcion and Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 4 Y.B. 
ARB. & MED. (forthcoming 2012); Hiro Aragaki, Status and contract in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Sept. 14, 2011, 3:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/status-and-contract-in-att-mobility-v-concepcion/. 
56 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011). 
57 Id. at 1750, 1752.  
58 Id. at 1752. 
59 Id. 
60 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (stating that arbitration is “[not] an 
adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding”); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (calling 
arbitration “inferior” to courtroom adjudication); cf. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (considering it “fantastic” that arbitrators could “decide legal issues”). 
61 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–262 (2011). 
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[M]any arbitrators may not be conversant with the public law 
considerations underlying the FLSA. FLSA claims typically involve 
complex mixed questions of fact and law . . . . Although an arbitrator 
may be competent to resolve many preliminary factual questions, such 
as whether the employee “punched in” when he said he did, he may 
lack the competence to decide the ultimate legal issue [of] whether an 
employee’s right to a minimum wage or to overtime pay under the 
statute has been violated.62  
Similarly, in Wilko v. Swan,63 the Court declared that arbitration was not an adequate alternative 
to a trial with respect to claims under the Securities Act of 1933, in part because the FAA’s 
vacatur standards were no substitute for “judicial review for error.”64  
The Court’s more recent position is that these earlier cases were “pervaded by . . . ‘the 
old judicial hostility to arbitration’”65—in other words, that they positively “disfavor[ed] 
arbitration” and were “far out of step” with the Court’s “current strong . . . favori[tism] [of] this 
method of resolving disputes.”66 If Concepcion’s limiting beliefs about arbitration are not 
materially different from those found in the early nonarbitrability cases, it is difficult to 
appreciate how the decision can possibly be squared with the favoritism theory.67  
Concepcion is further unfavorable toward arbitration because it tends to close off new 
possibilities—possibilities consistent with the early reformers’ desire to “raise arbitration to the 
status and dignity of judicial process.”68 In large part, modern FAA jurisprudence has been a 
jurisprudence of enablement. The “‘national policy favoring arbitration’”69 has been joined at the 
hip with a trend toward greater inclusiveness with respect to the scope of disputes covered by an 
arbitration agreement,70 the type of claims justiciable in arbitration,71 the range of gateway issues 
                                                     
62 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981). 
63 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989). 
64 Id. at 433, 436–37; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956). 
65 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (quoting Kulukundis Shipping 
Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)). 
66 Id. at 481 (emphasis added); see also Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985). 
67 As the California Supreme Court presciently observed over a decade ago and later again in Discover Bank, the 
proposition that arbitration is unsuitable to class actions itself “reflects, . . . ‘the very mistrust of arbitration that has 
been repudiated by the United States Supreme Court.’” Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1113 (Cal. 
2005) (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 693–94 (Cal. 2000)). 
68 Joseph Wheless, Arbitration as a Judicial Process of Law, 30 W. VA. L.Q. 210, 216 (1924); see also Sec. 
Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989) (describing the FAA’s purpose to “legitimate” 
arbitration); cf. REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 6 cmt., 23 cmt. B (2000), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uarba/arbitrat1213.htm [hereinafter RUAA] (describing the RUAA’s 
purpose to provide a “credibl[e]” and “true” alternative to litigation). 
69 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). 
70 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 
B.U. L. REV. 953, 972 (1986). 
71 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
7–8 (1997).  
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that may be entrusted to arbitrators,72 and the menu of remedies that arbitrators may consult when 
granting relief.73 A truly pro-arbitration ruling, therefore, would have seen Concepcion as an 
opportunity for enriching the arbitration alternative to class action litigation; it would have found 
a place at the table for this brave new thing called “class arbitration.”  
By contrast, Concepcion makes arbitration and class relief mutually exclusive almost by 
definition,74 and in this way represents a profoundly disabling moment in the history of modern 
arbitration law.75 Arbitration and the class mechanism are conceived as static and brittle, unable 
to evolve in new directions or to accommodate one another as times change. As a result, a 
distinctive process of collective claiming—one responsive to not just to the weaknesses but also 
to the strengths of the arbitral forum—is unlikely to see the light of day.76 This does not just mean 
that there will be fewer class arbitrations; ironically, it also means that there will also be fewer 
individual arbitrations.77 As Justice Breyer put it, “What rational lawyer would have signed on to 
represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 
claim?”78 This cannot possibly be favorable to arbitration’s future development.  
Those who persist in the belief that Concepcion is pro-arbitration make one of two errors. 
The first is to confuse the policy of favoring arbitration with that of favoring arbitration 
agreements. But rules that disfavor the strict enforcement of arbitration agreements, such as the 
unconscionability defense and the statutory and common law vacatur rules, play an important role 
in underwriting the legitimacy of the arbitration process.79 Consider a hypothetical law that would 
limit the enforceability of patently unfair arbitration agreements, like the agreement at issue in 
Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips.80 Preempting such a law would certainly favor arbitration 
agreements, but would we so easily conclude that it thereby favors arbitration?  
                                                     
72 See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2783–85 (2010) (holding that gateway decisions 
about the validity of arbitration agreements may be delegated to the arbitrators); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395 at 402–04 
(holding that arbitration clauses are severable, such that disputes over the validity of the container contract must be 
heard in arbitration).  
73 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 61 n.7 (1995). 
74 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (stating that class arbitration “is not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA”).  
75 Accord Thomas Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and 
the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L. ARB. 68–69 (2012).  
76 Cf. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner 
v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 122–24 (2011) (“[O]ne could find class arbitration attractive not only because of its 
potential to deal equally with similarly situated disputants but also because it might respond to . . . asymmetries 
between disputants.”). To be sure, parties might still choose to incorporate class arbitration procedures, but this would 
“not [be] arbitration as envisioned by the FAA,” Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753, and might therefore be prone to attack 
in other ways. See infra notes 254–259 and accompanying text. 
77 See Colin P. Marks, The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 31, 32 (2012). 
78 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
79 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Supreme Court Arbitration Rhetoric v. Reality and AT&T, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Apr. 15, 2011, 6:08 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/04/supreme-court-arbitration-
rhetoric-v-reality-and-att-mobility.html (arguing that simply to favor arbitration does not necessarily answer whether a 
clause banning class arbitration promotes or retards that policy). 
80 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing arbitration agreement that, inter alia, gave Hooters the ability to 
control the composition of the arbitral panel, including by placing its own managers on the panel); see also Baravati v. 
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that, consistent with the FAA, states could 
prohibit parties from agreeing to have their disputes presided over by a “panel of three monkeys . . . .”). 
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The second error is to confuse favoring arbitration with favoring the big businesses that 
are most apt to use it.81 It is difficult to quarrel with the observation that Concepcion favors big 
business, especially those keen on avoiding collective action claims (in arbitration or litigation).82 
But that is not the same as saying that it favors arbitration. Consider in this vein the one thousand 
or so duplicative arbitrations filed late last year by plaintiffs’ law firms on behalf of AT&T 
customers seeking to block AT&T’s announced merger with T-Mobile.83 Instead of honoring its 
own agreement to arbitrate, AT&T filed multiple actions in federal court seeking to block even 
these individual arbitrations. It argued that arbitrating these disputes (whether individually or as a 
class) would cause it irreparable injury, in part because arbitrators would be called on to evaluate 
“highly sophisticated and complex econometric and engineering models” and conduct “a detailed 
assessment of this evidence as it relates to the benefits to consumers and businesses”—tasks that 
presumably cannot be expected from an essentially fast, cheap, and simple adjudicative forum.84 
These statements may have come from the mouthpiece of arbitration’s supposed champion, but 
they certainly do not favor arbitration. They are better seen as embodying the type of limiting 
beliefs that the Court’s own jurisprudence in this area has sought to overturn.85  
                                                     
81 For examples of this error, see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Contracts that Prohibit Class-Action 
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/business/28bizcourt.html; Jim Hamilton, 
Supreme Court Ruling Continues Strong Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SEC. REG. 
(Apr. 28, 2011, 11:44 AM), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/supreme-court-ruling-continues-strong.html; 
Fisher & Phillips, LLP, Supreme Court Expands Use of Arbitration Agreements, FISHER & PHILLIPS BLOGS (Apr. 27, 
2011), http://www.laborlawyers.com/shownews.aspx?Supreme-Court-Expands-Use-Of-Arbitration-
Agreements&Ref=list&Type=1122&Show=13985.  
82 See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 74, 96 (2011) (special issue); Andrew Cohen, No 
Class: The Supreme Court’s Arbitration Ruling, THE ATLANTIC, (Apr. 27, 2011, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/04/no-class-the-supreme-courts-arbitration-ruling/237967/.  
83 See, e.g., Complaint, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Gonnello, No. 11–CV–05636 (PKC), 2011 WL 4716617 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011). See generally Terry Baynes, AT&T Sues Customers Who Seek to Block T-Mobile Deal, 
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Aug. 17, 2011), 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/News/2011/08_-
_August/AT_T_sues_customers_who_seek_to_block_T-Mobile_deal/. 
84 Complaint at ¶ 6, Gonnello, 2011 WL 4716617. Although these statements are highly suspect, the same is not 
necessarily true of AT&T’s argument that an arbitral forum would not sufficiently protect the interests of the public and 
third parties who were not signatories to AT&T’s arbitration agreement. The latter argument is based on unavoidable 
structural limitations of the arbitral forum rather than on a mistrust of the competence of arbitrators or the arbitration 
process, and for this reason does not appear to pose the same danger of hostility. Cf. Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1250–
54. 
85 See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
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II. CONCEPCION THROUGH THE LENS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
If contract and favoritism do not provide a persuasive account of Concepcion, what does? 
One answer may be that the decision is unabashedly political and abandons all pretense of a 
reasoned justification.86  
Against this view, I wish to suggest that Concepcion remains faithful to the general 
obstacle preemption framework described in Part I. Rather than abandon that framework 
altogether, it simply brings to the fore an alternative interpretation of the FAA’s purposes and 
objectives, and thus an alternative theory of what a state law must look like in order to stand as an 
obstacle to those objectives. As the title of this Article suggests, that alternative theory is 
grounded in the idea of antidiscrimination: of reversing the common law’s unfounded 
“suspicion,” “prejudice[],” and unjustified “hostility” toward arbitration.87 Coming to grips with 
that theory and its implications for the FAA’s preemptive reach will prove indispensable not just 
for making sense of an opinion that at first blush defies explanation, but also for developing a 
more ambitious critique, one that goes beyond the accusations of judicial partisanship or 
hypocrisy that have so far dominated commentary on the case.  
To appreciate Concepcion’s antidiscrimination moorings, one must dig beneath the 
surface. I begin, then, by exhuming the parties’ briefs on the merits. What is immediately striking 
here is that, despite the deep ideological chasm that separated them, AT&T and the Concepcions 
were in complete agreement that the outcome of the case hinged on whether the state law 
“discriminated” against arbitration.88 Thus, rather than challenge AT&T’s contention that 
Discover Bank should be preempted because it “runs afoul of th[e] fundamental 
nondiscrimination principle” enshrined in section 2,89 the Concepcions fully embraced it.90 “The 
preemption inquiry,” they concurred, “turns on whether the state law in question discriminates 
against arbitration.”91 The Concepcions simply disagreed that Discover Bank was discriminatory 
in the way that AT&T supposed.92  
To be sure, framing the FAA preemption question in this way seems peculiar, perhaps 
even jarring. Most of us rightly doubt whether arbitration can be understood as a victim of 
“discrimination.” Be that as it may, numerous courts and commentators have appreciated what I 
have elsewhere referred to as the equal opportunity underpinnings of the Court’s FAA 
                                                     
86 See generally Reuben, supra note 2 (criticizing the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, including Concepcion, as 
unprincipled and based on little more than judicial activism); Cliff Palefsky, Closing thoughts on the arbitration 
symposium, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 26, 2011, 6:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/closing-thoughts-on-the-
arbitration-symposium/. 
87 See Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1197. 
88 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 28–29, 36–37, 42; Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (No. 09–893) [hereinafter Transcript].  
89 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 28.  
90 They surely did not need to do so, because it was by no means a settled proposition even among arbitration 
scholars that one of the “purposes and objectives” of the FAA was to reverse “discrimination” against arbitration.  
91 Brief for Respondents at 17, AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (No. 09–893); see 
also id. at 9–10, 11, 13, 14.  
92 Concepcion thus became the first case on the merits before the U.S. Supreme Court to frame the FAA 
preemption analysis explicitly in terms of whether the state law “discriminated” against arbitration.  
  
   
 
52 
preemption jurisprudence.93 And for at least a decade, commentators have criticized state 
unconscionability rulings using the very same antidiscrimination arguments advanced by AT&T 
in Concepcion.94 My point in this Article is not to defend or attack the way in which FAA 
preemption doctrine has come to be organized around the idea of antidiscrimination. Instead, it is 
to draw attention to the undeniable fact of this organization and how it enables courts to deploy a 
potent rhetoric—often in ways that are internally inconsistent or incoherent—to legitimize the 
FAA’s extraordinary displacement of state law.95  
Surprisingly, few have ventured beyond the occasional, one-line reference to the FAA as 
an “anti-discrimination statute”96 or as “a kind of equal protection clause” for arbitration 
provisions97 in order to explain the meaning behind those claims. As a result, the 
antidiscrimination foundations of federal arbitration law remain to this day poorly understood and 
vastly under-theorized.98 This would prove particularly problematic in Concepcion because the 
precise antidiscrimination issue raised by AT&T was itself far more complex than what had 
previously come before the Court.99 The Court has typically preempted state laws that 
purposefully target arbitration—laws that “singl[e] out arbitration provisions for suspect status” 
on their face.100 By contrast, the Discover Bank standard seeks only to regulate class waivers. It is 
“facially neutral”101 both in the sense that it does not specifically mention arbitration and because 
it applies equally to class waivers in arbitration and litigation. The Concepcions argued that this 
facial neutrality rendered Discover Bank presumptively nondiscriminatory. AT&T countered that 
ostensibly neutral laws may nonetheless be used as a pretext for reviving the old judicial hostility 
toward arbitration, and that Discover Bank was a clear example of just that.  
                                                     
93 See Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1265–66. 
94 See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract 
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469 (2006); Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. 
Karr, California's "Unique" Approach to Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on 
the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61 (2005); Susan Randall, Judicial 
Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004).  
95 This is not an argument I have the luxury to explain here. See generally Aragaki, supra note 18 (arguing that 
the Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence should be understood as animated by a theory of nondiscrimination toward 
arbitration). 
96 Joshua Ratner & Christian Turner, Origin, Scope, and Irrevocability of the Manifest Disregard of the Law 
Doctrine: Second Circuit Views, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 795, 797–98 (2006). 
97 Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional 
Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1955 (2003). 
98 I say “federal arbitration law” rather than “the FAA” because the antidiscrimination theory arises from the 
Court’s interpretation of the FAA and of its legislative history more so than from the text of the statute itself. See 
Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1238, 1250, 1283. When I refer to the antidiscrimination principle of the FAA throughout 
this Article, therefore, I mean that principle as gleaned from FAA jurisprudence as a whole rather than from the text or 
original intent of the FAA in 1925.  
99 Accord AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011). 
100 Doctor’s Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).  
101 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 29; Brief for Respondents, supra note 91, at 24; Transcript, supra note 
88, at 35.  
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By definition, pretextual discrimination means purposeful discrimination.102 To describe 
an ostensibly neutral law as “pretextual” is not simply to claim that it happens to produce 
discriminatory results; rather, it is to claim that the law serves as a front for discrimination by 
design. Although this nuance appears to have been lost on counsel, it was immediately apparent 
to the justices during oral argument. Several of them, for instance, asked for a “test” that could be 
used to assess whether Discover Bank was in fact a “subterfuge”—that is, a “facially neutral 
contract law defense[] that implicitly discriminate[s] against arbitration.”103 Justice Breyer cut to 
the heart of the issue with the following colorful hypothetical:  
I would guess it’s like Switzerland having a law saying, we only buy 
milk from cows who are in pastures higher than 9,000 feet. That 
discriminates against milk from the rest of the continent. But to say we 
want cows that have passed the tuberculin test doesn’t. . . . And here, 
my impression is—correct me if I am wrong—the class arbitration 
exists. It’s . . . not like having a jury trial. You could have it in 
arbitration. You can have it in litigation. So where is the 9,000-foot 
cow, or whatever it is? Where is the discrimination?104 
Although the import of this hypothetical has remained obscure to most commentators,105 it is 
made plain once we understand the underlying issue as one of pretext. The hypothetical asks 
whether Discover Bank is more like a rule against low altitude milk or more like one against 
unpasteurized milk. Both are ostensibly neutral with respect to country of origin, but we suspect 
only the former to be a foil for hostility toward foreign milk. Why? Because there are good 
reasons to discriminate against unpasteurized milk. By contrast, altitude does not bear even a 
prima facie relationship to any valid purpose such as national health. The apparent arbitrariness 
of the 9,000 foot rule, in other words, makes it more likely to be motivated by xenophobia.106  
These and other exchanges during oral argument, together with the parties’ briefing of the 
issues, teed up the Court to resolve one and only one question: Was Discover Bank a pretext—a 
cover for intentional and unjustified discrimination against arbitration?107 Although the majority 
never uses the word “discrimination” in its holding,108 it effectively answers this question in the 
affirmative. It begins by observing that the FAA was enacted to rectify a widespread judicial 
                                                     
102 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (equating proof of “pretext[ual]” 
discrimination with proof of “intentional discrimination”); Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1284–85 (1988); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1307 (9th ed. 2009).  
103 Transcript, supra note 88, at 35 (Sotomayor, J.); see also id. at 16 (Sotomayor, J.); id. at 17 (Kagan, J.).  
104 Id. at 14.  
105 See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Can You Hear Them Now?, SLATE (Nov. 9, 2010, 6:54 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2010/11/can_you_hear_them_now.html.  
106 Justice Breyer also associated the 9,000 foot rule with “lying,” which again implies intentional misconduct. 
See Transcript, supra note 88, at 38.  
107 This, I take it, is related to Michael Helfand’s point that what was problematic to the Concepcion Court about 
Discover Bank is the way the standard facilitated the lower courts’ perceived “knee-jerk” hostility to AT&T’s 
arbitration clause. See Michael A. Helfand, Purpose, Precedent, and Politics: Why Concepcion Covers Less Than You 
Think, 4 Y.B. ARB. & MED. (forthcoming 2012). 
108 It did, however, characterize AT&T’s claim as a claim that “California law discriminated against arbitration” 
in its recitation of the procedural history. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). The 
dissent more explicitly frames the issue in terms of discrimination. See id. at 1758–59, 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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hostility toward arbitration109—a purpose that is just as easily frustrated by state laws that single 
out arbitration as by more subtle variants that nevertheless “‘derive their meaning from the fact 
that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’”110 It then considers whether Discover Bank can be 
distinguished from the following “parade of horribles”: (a) a rule requiring the availability of 
judicially monitored discovery in all public and private dispute resolution processes; (b) a rule 
requiring use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in such processes; or (c) a rule imposing jury fact 
finding in such processes.111 The Court suggests that these facially neutral rules are problematic 
not so much because they might end up destroying arbitration, but because we have reason to 
suspect that they were specifically “aimed at destroying arbitration.”112 Our suspicions, moreover, 
would hardly be “fanciful, since the judicial hostility towards arbitration that prompted the FAA 
ha[s] manifested itself in ‘a great variety’ of ‘devices and formulas’ declaring arbitration against 
public policy.”113 As an example of a “rationalization” for the first rule, a court could claim with a 
straight face that “no consumer would knowingly waive his right to full discovery, as this would 
enable companies to hide their wrongdoing.”114 Or, to “help avoid preemption,” the third rule 
could be dubbed a requirement to convene “‘a panel of twelve lay arbitrators.’”115 The crux of the 
Court’s holding is that Discover Bank is equally suspect because it is indistinguishable from any 
of these examples of pretextual discrimination.  
Properly understood, Concepcion thus stands for the proposition that Discover Bank 
somehow purposefully discriminates against arbitration. Many other commentators both within 
and outside of this Symposium have made the same observation, although they often employ the 
term “hostility” rather than “discrimination.”116 By locating Concepcion within an 
antidiscrimination paradigm, I do not mean to say that the contract and favoritism theories are no 
longer relevant. Contract and favoritism are important and enduring themes, not just in federal 
arbitration law but also in antidiscrimination theory. But as FAA preemption has increased in 
complexity, bringing within its purview not just state laws that single out arbitration but also 
those that are facially neutral, the older theories have begun to lose some of their explanatory 
power. Courts and litigants have more openly embraced antidiscrimination as an alternative 
                                                     
109 Id. at 1745, 1747 (majority opinion).  
110 Id. at 1746 (quotation omitted). This is very similar to the standard the Court has articulated in more 
traditional purpose-based antidiscrimination contexts. There, the fact that employers or state actors knew or could have 
foreseen that a protected group would be adversely affected by the law or measure in question is generally insufficient 
to prove intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Frazier v. Garrison, 980 F.2d 1514, 1526–27 (5th Cir. 1993). Instead, the 
law or measure must somehow take its meaning from the fact that a protected group will be adversely affected, in the 
sense that it was designed at least in part “because of, not merely in spite of,” its impact on the group. See Pers. Adm’r 
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
111 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. To be sure, neither Discover Bank nor any of these hypothetical laws 
“requires” or “imposes” anything in arbitration; it simply prohibits the waiver of certain procedural mechanisms such 
as class actions. See infra note 273. I use this particular formulation for the sake of simplicity only.  
112 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (emphasis added). 
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 See, e.g., Marks, supra note 77, at 31, 41; Resnik, supra note 76, at 125–26; Stipanowich, supra note 75, at 
376, 380; Jill Gross, AT&T Mobility, FAA Preemption, and Class Arbitration, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 9:29 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/att-mobility-faa-preemption-and-class-arbitration/ (stating that the Court 
held Discover Bank to be preempted by the FAA because of its “anti-arbitration animus”).  
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paradigm that is both more robust and more nuanced for purposes of addressing these new 
challenges.  
The basic problem, however, is that there is so far no widely-accepted consensus about 
the details of this alternative paradigm. To be sure, the cases are replete with cryptic maxims that 
sound in a distinctively antidiscrimination register: “Congress precluded States from singling out 
arbitration provisions for suspect status”;117 “the FAA is pre-emptive of state laws hostile to 
arbitration”;118 the savings clause does not protect a judicial holding that “rel[ies] on the 
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for” a determination of unconscionability.119 
The most famous of these is perhaps the following: 
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to 
enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to 
enforce its arbitration clause. The [FAA] makes any such state policy 
unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an 
unequal “footing,” directly contrary to the Act's language and 
Congress’ intent.120 
Most of us think we know what these maxims mean. We think we know, for example, 
how to spot a law that “takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at 
issue”121 or that fails to place arbitration agreements on an “equal footing.” But the truth is that 
we do not. We have been lulled into a false confidence about the nature, scope, and limits of these 
propositions and the legal arguments they can be expected to support. The litigation of 
Concepcion is a testament to this, and so it is to this issue that I now turn.  
III. LITIGATING CONCEPCION: THE PERILS OF PROTO-THEORY 
The parties’ framing of the FAA preemption issue in terms of whether Discover Bank 
“discriminated” against arbitration forced the Court to confront a complex set of questions not 
just about the nature of the FAA’s antidiscrimination mandate, but also about the circumstances 
in which a facially neutral law can be deemed to discriminate against arbitration by pretext.122 
Not surprisingly, the justices surfaced many of these questions during oral argument. But upon 
reading the transcript of the argument, it becomes painfully evident that counsel on both sides 
lacked the analytic tools and even the vocabulary to engage them on a meaningful level. The 
                                                     
117 Doctor’s Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
118 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001). 
119 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
120 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). 
121 Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
122 To be sure, some of these questions had begun to surface in the lower courts and had even come knocking on 
the Court’s door in the recent past. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16, Cingular Wireless LLC v. Mendoza, 
126 S. Ct. 2353 (2006) (No. 05–1119) (“Although we do not here challenge the Court's recognition of 
unconscionability as a potentially valid state-law basis for refusing to enforce an arbitration provision, this case 
demonstrates the need to provide guidance as to when a court’s invocation of this extraordinarily malleable doctrine 
truly is arbitration-neutral as opposed to being a subterfuge for engaging in anti-arbitration animus.”). See generally 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Beverly Enters.-Ill., Inc. v. Blazier, 130 S. Ct. 1698 (2009) (No. 09–747); Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc. v. Walker, 126 S. Ct. 730 (2005) (04–1672).  
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reason for this has less to do with the quality of counsel’s representation—which by all accounts 
was first rate and which I do not mean to criticize here—and more to do with the dearth of 
conceptual resources available to them for constructing sophisticated antidiscrimination 
arguments.   
My goal in this Part is to draw attention to and to critique the surprisingly 
underdeveloped state of the law in this area by focusing on three central questions that the parties 
were unable adequately to address during the litigation of Concepcion. Coming to grips with 
these questions will be indispensable if we are to have any hope of mastering the 
antidiscrimination theory of FAA preemption. 
A. What is the Subject of Discrimination? 
One of AT&T’s leading arguments for why Discover Bank discriminated against 
arbitration was that, instead of applying across the board to all agreements under the sun, it only 
applied to a subset of agreements—namely, consumer contracts that contain class waivers.123 In 
other words, the mere fact that some arbitration agreements fall within this subset while a whole 
range of other agreements do not (think of pharmaceutical, physician-patient, plumbing, 
prenuptial, prostate removal, and countless other agreements) is sufficient to establish 
discriminatory treatment. The obvious point that Discover Bank does not treat class waivers in 
arbitration any differently from those in litigation recedes into obscurity.  
AT&T’s flagship argument that a state law “discriminates” for FAA preemption purposes 
if it fails to “‘place[] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts’”124 is, 
however, hopelessly incoherent. No law—not even the defense of fraud or duress—applies in any 
meaningful sense, as one group of amici put it, to “‘any’ and every contract.”125 More to the point, 
the argument betrays a vital misunderstanding about the subject of the FAA’s antidiscrimination 
mandate. Most courts and commentators assume that the FAA’s purpose is to make arbitration 
agreements as enforceable as other contracts. But as I have already argued, making arbitration 
agreements as enforceable as other contracts was never an end in itself; rather, it was a means to 
enable the arbitration process to stand on an equal footing with litigation.126 At root, therefore, the 
subject of the FAA’s mandate must be the latter and not the former.  
A simple example from the antidiscrimination context will explain. The claim that a 
prosecutor’s use of the peremptory challenge to exclude African Americans from petit criminal 
juries violates the Equal Protection Clause is at root a claim that eligible African Americans are 
being discriminated against in favor of a comparison group. The comparison group plainly cannot 
consist of all other individuals, for the peremptory challenge is inapplicable to whole classes of 
persons (non-citizen permanent residents, children, convicted felons in custody, persons who 
                                                     
123 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 17–18, 28–31. 
124 Id. at 28 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)); see also Brief of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 25, AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (No. 09–893); Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law 
Professors, supra note 31, at 8.  
125 Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, supra note 124, at 25 (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). This is a complex argument that I have set out elsewhere. See Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1218–23.  
126 See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text; Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1223–24, 1228–35.  
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have served in the past twelve months, and residents of other states, to name a few). Yet this lack 
of universal applicability hardly shakes our confidence in the prosecutor’s evenhanded use of the 
challenge. What is relevant is only whether, given two or more groups whose members are 
functionally interchangeable in the sense that each could perform jury service in the same way, 
one is being disfavored for no reason other than race.127 Thus, one way of raising an inference of 
race-based discrimination would be to show that the prosecutor used his peremptories more 
frequently against eligible African Americans than he did against eligible whites.128  
Now consider three different contract clauses: (i) an arbitration clause containing a class 
arbitration waiver, (ii) an attorney fee-shifting clause, and (iii) a release of liability clause. Like 
the prosecutor’s use of the peremptory challenge in my example, Discover Bank arguably has an 
adverse effect only on the arbitration clause; it has no application whatsoever to the other two or 
indeed to most other contract clauses. But the fact that Discover Bank does not apply in this way 
to “all” clauses is surely not what it means for Discover Bank to discriminate. We do not suspect, 
for instance, that the California Supreme Court devised the Discover Bank standard in order to 
enable more attorney fee-shifting clauses to be enforced or to encourage contract drafters to 
include more releases in their form contracts. Striking the arbitration clause as unconscionable 
does not somehow favor the other two clauses in the way that excluding eligible African 
Americans from jury service favors eligible whites. The reason is that the other clauses are not 
functionally interchangeable with the arbitration clause and thereby provide no salient 
comparison group for purposes of establishing discrimination. 
To the extent that the facially neutral Discover Bank rule can be considered 
discriminatory at all, therefore, it must be because the rule treats arbitration and litigation 
differently for essentially arbitrary reasons—reasons that we suspect derive from the common 
law’s legacy of “jealousy” toward the arbitral forum.129 This makes eminent sense not just as a 
matter of logic but also in light of the history of Anglo-American arbitration law. The central 
question that flows through that history—from Scott v. Avery130 to Tobey v. Bristol131 to Wilko v. 
Swan132 and finally, I argue, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion—is the question of whether arbitration 
and litigation are functionally equivalent dispute resolution forums, not whether arbitration 
agreements are or should be interchangeable with other contracts.  
                                                     
127 Robert Post identifies this type of “functional rationality” as a basic premise behind the dominant conception 
of American antidiscrimination law. See ROBERT C. POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 24–26 (2001). 
128 By contrast, evidence that African Americans in the jury venire were being disfavored relative to persons who 
wear crimson sweatshirts, persons whose last name begins with “A,” or persons whose diet includes durian, without 
more, is of absolutely no moment until we know which of these persons were also members of the class of eligible 
whites.  
129 See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on 
the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 16 (1924) (statement of Julius Henry Cohen); STERLING, TO MAKE 
VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CERTAIN AGREEMENTS FOR ARBITRATION, S. REP. NO. 68–536, at 2–3 (1924); H.R. REP. NO. 
68–96, at 1–2 (1924); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 
283 (1926). 
130 [1856] 10 Eng. Rep. 1135 (H.L.). 
131 23 F. Cas. 1313 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). 
132 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
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Despite what may in hindsight appear to be a fairly obvious point, FAA preemption 
doctrine continues to exhibit a bewildering indecisiveness about something as foundational as the 
subject of its antidiscrimination principle. Consider that the essentially specious “all contracts” 
ratio has for more than ten years been the leading standard used by lower courts to determine 
whether facially neutral laws other than standard contract law defenses are preempted by the 
FAA.133 The confusion is so widespread and unquestioned that not even AT&T saw through it 
clearly. If it had, it surely would not have led with an argument that even justices who joined the 
majority dismissed as a non-starter.134 Instead, AT&T would have focused its efforts on 
developing an argument that was still inchoate in its brief but that eventually carried the day: the 
claim that Discover Bank, like the Court’s parade of horribles, is tainted by the impermissible 
“assumption that arbitration cannot vindicate the public interest to the same extent as judicial 
class actions.”135  
Confusion about the subject of discrimination is problematic not simply because it breeds 
imprecision or inconsistency but because it tempts obfuscation. When courts mobilize the rhetoric 
of antidiscrimination to justify preempting state laws without being clear about the very subject of 
their purported solicitude, the resulting lack of transparency can be exploited to reach result-
driven decisions. Consider a forum selection statute, facially neutral in the way I describe 
above,136 that voids any agreement by persons with little or no bargaining power (e.g., a 
franchisee or consumer) to resolve disputes outside her home state. The overwhelming majority 
of courts hold that such laws violate the maxim to place arbitration agreements on an “equal 
footing with all other contracts”137 because the laws apply (i) only to forum selection clauses in 
(ii) only one type of contract (e.g., franchise, consumer).138 What gets occluded by this analysis, 
of course, is that those laws still treat arbitration and litigation exactly the same.139  
When the tables are turned, however, precisely the opposite argument is invoked. Thus, 
when the law at issue is a common law defense that (according to FAA lore) applies to all 
                                                     
133 See Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1204–06. 
134 Justices Scalia and Kennedy expressed incredulity at the argument, pointing out the obvious fact that most 
legislative enactments—including those that AT&T readily conceded were not discriminatory—do not in fact apply to 
“all” contracts. See Transcript, supra note 88, at 4, 11, 23 (Scalia, J.); id. at 22 (Kennedy, J.). I have elsewhere sought 
to show that the argument is fundamentally incoherent. See Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1218–23; Brief of Arbitration 
Professors, supra note 50, at 25–29. The fact that two of the five justices in the majority signaled their strong 
inclination to reject the “all contracts” standard is perhaps one of the saving graces of Concepcion. It suggests that what 
is currently the majority approach to FAA preemption of facially neutral statutes in the lower courts, exemplified by 
cases such as Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2001), would not survive if presented 
to the Court for decision. 
135 Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors, supra note 31, at 10, 25; see also Brief for Petitioner, 
supra note 31, at 50–51 (implying that state laws contravene the FAA when they impose on arbitration “‘procedural 
accoutrements’” characteristic of litigation, which effectively “amount[s] to ‘an attack on the character of arbitration 
itself’” (quoting Iberia Credit Bureau v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
136 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
137 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).  
138 See, e.g., Bradley, 275 F.3d at 890; KKW Enters., Inc. v. Gloria Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 
184 F.3d 42, 51–52 (1st Cir. 1999); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1998). But see 
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Mont. 1998). 
139 Moreover, the two are similarly situated with respect to the purpose behind such laws, which is to protect 
weaker parties from unfair hardship and to make it more difficult for stronger parties to evade liability for wrongful 
conduct. 
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contracts, those seeking preemption argue that the law “rests on nothing less than an assumption 
that arbitration, just because it is arbitration, is less desirable than litigation.”140 In other words, 
when it is no longer feasible to claim that arbitration agreements have been placed on a different 
footing than other contracts, the axis of comparison switches to arbitration vs. litigation. “Heads 
we win, tails you lose.”  
B. Is Discrimination Equivalent to Doctrinal Deviation? 
AT&T’s other leading argument was that Discover Bank discriminated against arbitration 
because it represented such a “distortion” of California unconscionability doctrine that “[w]e have 
not located a single precedential California decision” to support it.141 The gravamen of this claim 
is not that Discover Bank merely extends or adapts the doctrine in questionable ways—ways that 
a reviewing court would leave undisturbed.142 Instead, it is that Discover Bank is unprecedented 
and erroneous as a matter of law, among other things because it considers the fairness of a clause 
(i) to persons who are not parties to the agreement and (ii) in light of subsquent events, rather 
than events at the time of contracting.143 These “significant” and “extreme” doctrinal 
“deviat[ions]”144 from settled unconscionability principles, AT&T argued, are sufficient to 
“demonstrate[] impermissible discrimination.”145  
But a moment’s thought should reveal that there is no necessary connection between 
discrimination and doctrinal error. Incorrect applications of the law may well be considered 
nondiscriminatory, as when laws are misapplied because of incompetence, oversight, or a self-
confessed desire to further other, more important ends. And depending on how discrimination is 
defined, even incorrect applications that produce starkly disproportionate outcomes, if 
unaccompanied by improper motives, may not count as discriminatory.146  
By the same token, correct applications of the law may well be discriminatory. A good 
example of this is Batson v. Kentucky,147 the inspiration for my previous example involving the 
                                                     
140 McGuinness & Karr, supra note 94, at 83; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors, 
supra note 31, at 25, 29; Burton, supra note 94, at 486, 488; Randall, supra note 94, at 198–220 (arguing that hostility 
in the application of the unconscionability rule may be inferred from stark differences in the way courts assess the 
fairness of a dispute resolution term relating to arbitration versus litigation). The flip side of this is that courts find no 
hostility, and thus no FAA preemption, when the unconscionability defense appears to be applied in a manner that does 
not “express the impermissible view that arbitration is inferior to litigation . . . .” Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular 
Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 170 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 134 (2d 
Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom., Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. v. Fensterstock, 131 S. Ct. 2989 (2011); Carbajal v. 
H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2004). 
141 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 36; see also id. at 32–33, 37, 39; supra note 31 and accompanying 
text.  
142 Accord Brief for Respondents, supra note 91, at 35–36 (describing AT&T’s argument as raising “a question of 
state law, which this Court does not sit to review” (citation omitted)). 
143 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 34–38.  
144 Id. at 32, 39. 
145 Id. at 37 (emphasis added); see also id. at 36; Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors, supra note 
31, at 18; Transcript, supra note 88, at 6–7 (arguing that Discover Bank’s doctrinal deviations, without more, “quite 
clear[ly]” establish discrimination). 
146 See infra note 163 and accompanying text.  
147 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986). 
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peremptory challenge. The gist of Mr. Batson’s equal protection claim was not that the prosecutor 
had exercised his preremptories incorrectly (for example, because he had used too many). Quite 
the contrary: It was that it is virtually impossible for the prosecutor to do so, which is precisely 
what makes the discrimination so difficult to prove. If Mr. Batson had been required to establish 
an error of state law before he could establish his federal constitutional claim, equal protection 
law would entirely fail to capture much of what we consider pretextual discrimination. By 
overlooking this hallmark of a claim sounding in pretext—namely, the use of something 
legitimate to cover something illegitimate—AT&T underappreciated the crux of its own pretext-
based claim.  
Equipped with a more sophisticated account of discrimination under the FAA, AT&T 
might have marshaled a much stronger argument: Even if Discover Bank were a perfectly valid 
application or “refinement” of longstanding unconscionability principles (as the Concepcions and 
their amici had contended), it was still discriminatory and thus preempted.148 The argument was 
hardly beyond contemplation. A loud chorus of courts and commentators has increasingly warned 
that unconscionability is being used as a ruse for a “new judicial hostility” toward arbitration.149 
In its strongest form, the contention is not so much that courts are getting the law of 
unconscionability wrong (even though, for want of a better alternative, this is indeed how many 
have framed it).150 Instead, it is that the absence of bright line rules in the unconscionability area 
allows them to get it right and thereby to perpetuate the legacy of anti-arbitration hostility in ways 
that escape easy detection.151  
Using doctrinal deviation as a proxy for discrimination did not just prevent AT&T from 
advancing much stronger arguments. Crucially, it also collapsed the federal preemption inquiry 
into a question of state contract law.152 This effectively put AT&T in the odious position of 
asking the Court to review the California Supreme Court’s Discover Bank decision on the 
merits—a request that even AT&T must have realized was deeply problematic from a federalism 
                                                     
148 By the same token, the Concepcions might have argued that, even if AT&T were correct that the California 
Supreme Court had misapplied established unconscionability principles in Discover Bank, there were other, perfectly 
plausible explanations for this having nothing to do with discrimination. But they did not. See Brief for Petitioner, 
supra note 31, at 31–39. The reason for this, again, is not a failing on counsel’s part; instead, it stems from the problem 
that FAA jurisprudence currently lacks the doctrinal and theoretical resources with which to construct such an 
antidiscrimination-based argument.  
149 Burton, supra note 94, at 489–500; McGuinness & Karr, supra note 94, at 62; Thomas H. Riske, Note, No 
Exceptions: How the Legitimate Business Justification for Unconscionability Only Further Demonstrates California 
Courts’ Disdain for Arbitration Agreements, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 591, 600–01 (2008).  
150 See, e.g., Randall, supra note 94, at 186. 
151 This distinction appears to have been entirely lost on AT&T’s amici. The thrust of the “new judicial hostility” 
claim is not, as the amici put it, that courts are “hid[ing] this distortion [of the common law defense] in the garb of 
general unconscionability law.” Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors, supra note 31, at 32. Rather, it is 
that they are hiding discrimination within it.  
152 This is especially problematic in a case like Concepcion for two reasons. First, unconscionability 
determinations are notoriously difficult to review. See Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1289–92. Second, when a state court’s 
application of the unconscionability defense is raised to a federal court, it implicates a host of other federalism 
concerns. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal 
Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1444–59 (2008). 
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perspective.153 The fact that AT&T persisted with the argument all the same speaks volumes 
about the reigning confusion over what it means to “discriminate” for purposes of FAA 
preemption.  
Here one might reasonably ask how AT&T and others who fear the pretextual use of the 
unconscionability doctrine can prove discrimination without the crutch of doctrinal 
misapplication. An answer is suggested by a distinctive characteristic of pretext claims that we 
considered earlier: They presuppose intentional discriminatory treatment. As such, it should be 
possible to demonstrate that an adverse unconscionability determination, even if doctrinally 
unremarkable, was nonetheless motivated by impermissible hostility to arbitration.154 For 
instance, a court might enunciate the familiar unconscionability rule yet apply it in a way that 
betrays “outmoded presumptions” about arbitration’s inferiority to litigation.155 A court might 
also drop other hints in its opinion that suggest a visceral rather than reasoned opposition to 
arbitration.156 A good example of the former is the California Supreme Court’s much-discussed 
opinion in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.157 Armendariz raises far 
fewer doctrinal red flags than Discover Bank. But because the holding in Armendariz rests in part 
on questionable assumptions about arbitration’s competence and desirability as a dispute 
resolution forum, it is arguably beset by the same anti-arbitration hostility prohibited by the 
FAA.158  
A final retort is that doctrinal irregularities and departures from the ordinary course, 
without more, are sometimes sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination.159 Although this is 
certainly true, AT&T was not making this much more subtle point. Even if it were, it failed to 
offer persuasive reasons for drawing such an inference in the case of Discover Bank. In particular, 
it did not even attempt to explain how and why the doctrinal deviations it identified might be 
indicative of hostility specifically toward arbitration rather than toward class waivers.160 Recall 
that Discover Bank does not apply only to arbitration clauses or even to all arbitration clauses; its 
                                                     
153 Many justices expressed strong disinclination even to entertain AT&T’s claim that Discover Bank was 
erroneous as a matter of California state law. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 88, at 5, 7 (Scalia, J.) (“Are we going to 
tell the State of California what it has to consider unconscionable?”); id. at 8 (Ginsburg, J.); id. at 19 (Kagan, J.); id. at 
21 (Breyer, J.); id. at 24 (Sotomayor, J.). 
154 See Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1293–1303. 
155 This, indeed, is the approach followed by many courts when holding that a particular application of the 
unconscionability defense is not discriminatory and thus saved from preemption by the FAA. See, e.g., Iberia Credit 
Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 170 (5th Cir. 2004); Carbajal v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 
372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004). 
156 Accord Bruhl, supra note 152, at 1451–52 (suggesting that “anti-arbitration comments” by a court may be 
sufficient to establish a discriminatory application of the unconscionability defense). For a good example, see Casarotto 
v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940–41 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring) (describing the “total lack of 
procedural safeguards” in arbitration and blaming arbitration of “subvert[ing] our system of justice as we have come to 
know it.”), vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995). 
157 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). 
158 See Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1300–02. 
159 Even in the equal protection context, departures from the ordinary course are not sufficient in themselves to 
warrant the inference; the court must also consider the totality of the circumstances. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67 (1977).  
160 Not all arbitration clauses contain class waivers. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 103–04 (2009) (analyzing empirical data showing great variation in 
frequency with which class waivers appear in arbitration clauses). 
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real target is class waivers in consumer contracts. Thus, even when Discover Bank is used to void 
such a waiver, there are no necessary ramifications for the promise to arbitrate because courts 
may still order the case to class arbitration (as many have).161 Moreover, Discover Bank imposes 
the identical restriction on class waivers in the litigation process. Something more is therefore 
needed to support the conclusion that Discover Bank’s irregularities (if any) “express the 
impermissible view that arbitration is inferior to litigation.”162 Doctrinal departures alone do not 
get us there.  
C. Purpose- or Effects-Based Discrimination? 
Mature antidiscrimination theories broadly recognize the distinction between intent-based 
and impact-based discrimination, and they make a self-conscious choice to rectify one or the 
other (or sometimes both). For instance, the heightened scrutiny afforded to suspect and quasi-
suspect classes under the Equal Protection Clause requires proof of invidious purpose; the mere 
fact that the law’s impact “may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to 
the more affluent white”163 is insufficient. By contrast, reasonable accommodation claims and 
statutory “disparate impact” claims seek to rectify more than purposeful discrimination. They 
therefore require no proof of intent; the only relevant question is whether a particular measure 
produces a certain type or degree of unequal outcome.164  
In the FAA context there has been comparatively little if any consideration of whether the 
FAA’s antidiscrimination principle is aimed at remedying the law’s purposeful disparate 
treatment of arbitration or merely its unintended effects on arbitration. Courts and commentators 
routinely blur this distinction, as a result of which the all-important question of just what must be 
proven to establish discrimination has remained largely unasked and unanswered.  
This basic ambiguity about whether the FAA represents a purpose- or effects-based 
antidiscrimination regime haunted the litigation of Concepcion from start to finish. Justice Kagan 
put her finger on it during oral argument, when she pointedly asked counsel whether the test for 
discrimination under the FAA was “a purpose test or an effects test.” That is, “[i]s it a test that 
says the State is doing this in order to kill arbitration, or is it a test that says the State is doing 
                                                     
161 This typically happens when the clause contains a severability provision or the court otherwise determines that 
the class waiver is severable. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 103 (N.J. 
2006); Woods v. Q.C. Fin. Servs., 280 S.W.3d 90, 99–100 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. 
Wittrock, Is There a Flight From Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 106–08 & n.169 (2008). This was not a 
possibility in Concepcion only because AT&T’s arbitration clause contained a “blowout” provision to the effect that if 
a court should strike the class waiver, the entire clause would fail and the dispute would be heard in a court of law. See 
Brief for Respondents, supra note 91, at 3.  
162 Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 170 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying FAA 
preemption challenge to state unconscionability rule for this reason; cited in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 32, 
50–51). 
163 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
164 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil 
Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 835–36 (2003); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 642, 648–58 (2001).  
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something that will kill arbitration?”165 What is striking as one reads the transcript of oral 
argument is that counsel did not appear to have the first idea about how to answer this question. 
The state of confusion surrounding this critical issue, in turn, had strategic consequences for both 
parties.  
For example, in response to Justice Kagan’s question, counsel for the Concepcions stated 
that “I think you can look to both.”166 In other words, either purpose or effects might be 
sufficient, which is the same as saying that proof of discriminatory purpose is strictly 
unnecessary. As the party resisting the charge of discrimination, however, the Concepcions 
should have argued precisely the opposite. Discriminatory intent, after all, is extremely difficult 
to establish because it must almost always be inferred from circumstantial evidence.167 By 
following this strategy, the Concepcions would have put AT&T to the test of proving not just that 
class-wide relief happens to place intolerable burdens on arbitration, but that the California 
Supreme Court willed those burdens when it issued its ruling back in 2005—a time, moreover, 
when class arbitration did not seem especially antithetical to arbitration.168  
But the Concepcions did not adopt this strategy even though it was perfectly viable given 
the way the Court and AT&T had characterized Discover Bank as a pretext.169 At best, the 
Concepcions seemed hazy, sometimes arguing that Discover Bank should avoid preemption 
because it was not “aimed at destroying arbitration”170 and at other times contending that the mere 
fact that it destroys arbitration was sufficient.171 At worst, they affirmatively endorsed an effects-
based paradigm. This surfaced most clearly in the Concepcions’ attempts to distinguish Discover 
Bank from AT&T’s parade of horribles. In their brief, the Concepcions argued that the latter were 
preempted because they “demand[ed] procedures incompatible with arbitration” and would 
                                                     
165 Transcript, supra note 88, at 49; see also id. at 17 (Kagan, J.); id. at 35–36 (Sotomayor, J.) (“I don’t want to 
look through legislative history and determine whether some committee person said something that sounds like 
subterfuge. How do I look at the law and its effects and determine that subterfuge or that discrimination?”); id. at 48 
(Breyer, J.) (“What do I look to? It’s not logic . . . . [W]hat should I read to show, in your opinion, you’re right?”). 
166 See Transcript, supra note 88, at 49.  
167 See, e.g., Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987); Ralph Richard Banks & Richard 
Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 
1074 (2009). 
168 Consider that Discover Bank was handed down less than two years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003)—widely interpreted as donning implicit approval to class 
arbitration—and five years before Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010), 
where the Court first suggested that class arbitration might not even be arbitration at all. In large part because of the 
Bazzle decision, the AAA and a number of other arbitration providers developed class arbitration rules. See Brief of 
American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9–12, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2009) (No. 08–1198). 
169 See supra notes 101–115 and accompanying text. Moreover, as I have elsewhere argued, the best 
interpretation of the Court’s FAA jurisprudence is that only purpose-based discrimination is prohibited. See Aragaki, 
supra note 50, at 1210–18 (distinguishing between formal and fair equality of opportunity). 
170 Brief for Respondents, supra note 91, at 32; see also Transcript, supra note 88, at 48–51. 
171 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, supra note 91, at 11 (arguing that the FAA does not permit states to impose 
procedures that are “fundamentally incompatible” with arbitration); id. at 32–35; Transcript, supra note 88, at 38–39 
(arguing that the test is whether the state law is “tantamount to a rule of non-enforceability of arbitration agreements”); 
id. at 47–48 (arguing that the hypothetical laws discriminate because of their “systematic effect[s]”); id. at 49.  
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thereby end up “destroy[ing]” the FAA unless they were preempted.172 Likewise, they suggested 
that the problem with the ouster rule (which they assimilated to the parade of horribles) was its 
“discriminatory effect[s]” on arbitration173 rather than, as is commonly supposed, the anti-
arbitration motives behind those effects.174 By focusing on effects at the expense of purpose, these 
arguments reduced the resolution of the case to one of simple line-drawing: Does Discover Bank 
burden arbitration to quite the same degree as the parade of horribles? Ironically, it was the 
Concepcions’ own framing of the issue in this way that led an exasperated Justice Alito to foretell 
the outcome of the case in this exchange with the Concepcions’ counsel during oral argument: 
What is the difference . . . between a rule that says you must follow the 
rules of evidence in every adjudication and a rule that says that class 
adjudication must always be available? I think your answer comes 
down to the proposition that the former is inconsistent with the idea of 
arbitration, and therefore, that’s why it’s not allowed, and the latter is 
not inconsistent with the idea of arbitration, and therefore, it is 
allowed. . . . [I]n the end . . . . we have to make a value judgment about 
whether these things, one thing or the other, fits with arbitration. That’s 
what it comes down to.175 
For its part, AT&T appeared just as confused as the Concepcions about the 
purpose/effects distinction and its importance to the outcome of the case. AT&T took the state of 
California to task for intentionally targeting arbitration, not for devising well-meaning rules that 
unexpectedly interfered with the enforceability of arbitration agreements.176 The ostensibly 
“even-handed” Discover Bank rule, in its view, was “gerrymandered to target arbitration 
provisions,”177 “devise[d]” to encumber arbitration with all the accoutrements of litigation,178 
“aimed directly at agreements to resolve disputes—[which] almost invariably [means] arbitration 
agreements,”179 and for these reasons “resuscitat[es] . . . judicial hostility to arbitration.”180 
Similarly, when comparing Discover Bank to the parade of horribles, AT&T suggested that the 
                                                     
172 Brief for Respondents, supra note 91, at 32. Even a “mere preference for procedures that are incompatible 
with arbitration,” they argued, would be preempted. See id. at 33. This makes proof of calculated hostility to arbitration 
strictly unnecessary, because a state’s “mere preference” for a procedure might stem from a variety of arbitration-
neutral considerations including tradition, economic efficiency, or a concern about the reasonable expectations of 
parties. The real reason behind the claim that even a “mere preference” would be preempted must, therefore, be that 
incompatibility alone is sufficient to warrant preemption. 
173 Id. at 33–34. 
174 See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1250–54. 
175 Transcript, supra note 88, at 46–47 (Alito, J.) (emphasis added). 
176 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 42.  
177 Id. at 20; see also id. at 40.  
178 Id. at 29; see also id. at 42.  
179 Id. at 47; see also id. at 50–51. 
180 Id. at 41 (quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959) for the 
proposition that “the FAA was enacted to overrule ‘a great variety’ of judicial ‘devices and formulas’ declaring 
arbitration agreements ‘against public policy’”); see also id. at 32. 
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problem with the latter was the bad motives they betrayed rather than their destructive effect on 
arbitration.181  
A far easier and more direct route to proving discrimination would have been to piggy 
back on the Concepcions’ argument by contending that Discover Bank’s devastating effect on 
arbitration, without more, was sufficient to prove discrimination.182 This was certainly a plausible 
contention.183 AT&T was moreover astute enough to realize that Justice Scalia, at least, would 
have been receptive to it given the tenor of his questions during oral argument in Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,184 the other High Court case to address class arbitration. There, he 
asked: “Why isn’t the Federal Arbitration Act more reasonably interpreted as directed at those 
State laws that . . . are destructive of arbitration, that . . . are hostile not in the sense of any . . . 
mental intent, but that in their operation make it difficult for parties to enter into arbitration 
agreements?”185 Sure enough, the majority’s opinion—authored by none other than Justice 
Scalia—adopted precisely this effects-based standard.186 For rather than attempt to determine 
whether Discover Bank, like the hypothetical laws in the parade of horribles, disguised a purpose 
to discriminate, the majority characterized those laws as “fundamentally incompatible” with 
arbitration and simply asked whether Discover Bank was likewise incompatible.  
IV. THE MAJORITY’S REASONING: A CRITIQUE AND RECONSTRUCTION 
The parties’ above-described handicaps in presenting persuasive accounts of what makes 
Discover Bank discriminatory (or not) for FAA preemption purposes left the Court largely to its 
own devices when deciding the case. Notably, even though it agreed with the result advocated by 
                                                     
181 Id. at 50 (describing the parade of horribles as evincing a “concern[] that traditional arbitration hinders parties 
situated similarly to the plaintiff from learning of infringements of their legal rights,” or a “convi[ction] of the 
superiority of jury trials”). Likewise, AT&T’s amici argued that Discover Bank and other California unconscionability 
precedents evince a purpose to “target arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment.” Brief Amici Curiae of 
Distinguished Law Professors, supra note 31, at 10. 
182 To be sure, AT&T argued in passing that Discover Bank had a disparate “impact” on arbitration because it had 
the “effect . . . [of] transfor[ming] arbitration in the ways the Court described in Stolt Nielsen.” Transcript, supra note 
88, at 10; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 21, 30–31. But these remarks were so understated that they 
sound more like afterthoughts or arguments made for the sake of completeness. It is moreover unclear whether AT&T 
meant to say that these disparate impacts are important for drawing an inference of intentional discrimination or 
whether they are sufficiently actionable in themselves. For instance, AT&T argued that Discover Bank’s disparate 
impact on arbitration would “as a practical matter allow use of ‘the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis 
for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.’” Id. at 30–31. Because a state would only consider 
the uniqueness of an arbitration agreement if it intended to target arbitration, the argument suggests that impacts are 
simply a means of establishing intent. 
183 In unsuccessful certiorari petitions filed in similar cases, AT&T’s counsel Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP 
advanced precisely this type of effects-based argument for FAA preemption. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
at 15–16, Cingular Wireless LLC v. Mendoza, 547 U.S. 1188 (2006) (No. 05–1119). The majority opinion in 
Concepcion not only ends up adopting an effects-based discrimination test, its declarations about the incompatibility 
between collective actions and the arbitration process also read as if they had been lifted straight from the arguments 
made by Mayer Brown in these unsuccessful certiorari petitions. 
184 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
185 Transcript of Oral Argument at 53 (Scalia, J.), Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (No. 02–
634). 
186 Accord Marks, supra note 77, at 43–44. 
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AT&T, the majority did not incorporate or rely on any of AT&T’s leading arguments.187 Instead, 
it held that Discover Bank discriminated against arbitration because the rule imposed a procedure 
that had the effect of destroying arbitration.  
In this Part, I argue that the Court’s adoption of an effects-based standard of 
discrimination—and, more importantly, its reliance on essentialism to vindicate that standard—
was a mistake for reasons that extend far beyond the confines of this particular case. I then argue 
that the Court should have stayed true to its longstanding position that the FAA was enacted to 
reverse the “‘old judicial law hostility to arbitration’”188 by asking whether Discover Bank 
evinced a discriminatory purpose.  
A. The Causes and Consequences of Essentialism  
A keystone of the Court’s holding in Concepcion is the assertion that class arbitration is 
not really “arbitration.” Class-wide relief, we are told, produces a “structural” change that 
“interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration.”189 Class arbitration is time consuming, 
formalistic, and procedurally complex—all the things that arbitration under the FAA is neither 
supposed to be nor likely can be. These and similar claims in the Court’s decision are problematic 
not so much because they are empirically dubious190 as because they unnecessarily essentialize 
arbitration: They purport to identify, once and for all, certain constitutive or definitional features 
of the arbitral process. 
It may be tempting here to think of this essentialism as following inescapably from the 
Court’s decision one year earlier in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International.191 There, the 
Court opined that class proceedings were inconsistent with the very “nature of arbitration,” such 
that the shift from bilateral to class-wide arbitration would change the arbitral process in 
                                                     
187 See supra notes 134, 153 and accompanying text. Although it is true that the parade of horribles originated in 
AT&T’s brief, AT&T did not use it to make an affirmative argument that Discover Bank was discriminatory. Rather, 
AT&T used it to rebut the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that Discover Bank should withstand preemption because it 
applied equally to arbitration and litigation. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 31, at 28–31. The mere fact that a state 
law applied to both forums, AT&T argued, could not be dispositive of the discrimination question because one can 
imagine many such laws that are clearly inimical to the FAA, such as a law requiring the use of jury trials in any 
dispute resolution context. Thus, AT&T’s argument was fundamentally defensive in nature. 
188 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 266 (2009) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989)). 
189 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1751; 
supra note 56 and accompanying text.  
190 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 76, at 122–23; Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the 
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 40–42 & n.149 (2000); S.I. Strong, Does 
Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 205–10 (2012).   
191 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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“fundamental” ways.192 These sweeping pronouncements likely informed the majority’s analysis 
in Concepcion. But as others have noted, they did not preordain that analysis.193  
An alternative or perhaps more compelling explanation for Concepcion’s essentialism is 
that it helps establish that arbitration and litigation are differently situated, such that treating them 
exactly the same (as Discover Bank does) amounts to a type of discrimination.194 Using the FAA 
to preempt Discover Bank then begins to look perfectly consistent with the goal of 
nondiscrimination, because it effectively allows the two forums to be treated differently in ways 
that reflect their essential differences.195 From this standpoint, Concepcion appears simply to 
reaffirm the principle that “[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that 
are different as though they were exactly alike.”196 If this is, in fact, the underlying logic of the 
majority’s reasoning in Concepcion, then it is a very complex logic indeed, one that raises more 
questions than it answers and one whose consequences must be carefully considered.  
It may be helpful here to look at how claims of equality predicated on the need for 
differential treatment—rather than on the default rule of similar treatment—have played out in 
more traditional antidiscrimination contexts. The dominant paradigm of American 
antidiscrimination law perceives the wrong of discrimination in terms of a failure to recognize our 
inherent sameness across race, gender, and other status-based categories.197 It constructs a world 
in which men and women are presumed to have the same ability to become, say, firefighters or 
care givers; a world in which African-Americans and whites are presumed interchangeable for 
purposes of becoming office managers or jurors.198 Status-based differences are thereby rendered 
irrelevant; what matters is simply the individual’s functional capacity to perform the task at 
hand.199  
As intuitively appealing as it is in form, however, this “sameness” model is potentially 
problematic because it overlooks real and unavoidable differences between groups. Gender 
                                                     
192 Id. at 1775–76. The Court’s essentialistic proclivities arguably surfaced even before Stolt-Nielsen. See, e.g., 
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357 (2008) (foreshadowing similar remarks in Concepcion by holding that a “prime 
objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve ‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious results’”); Hall St. Assocs. 
v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (describing arbitration’s “essential virtue” in terms of “resolving disputes 
straightaway” without any substantive review of the merits of arbitration awards). 
193 See Nagareda, supra note 14, at 1106–09. Stolt-Nielsen raised a question of party intent or contractual gap-
filling. There, essentialism was used to establish that class-wide relief “changes the nature of arbitration to such a 
degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an 
arbitrator.” Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (emphasis added). That is not, however, the same as saying that the change 
is so great that a state may not legitimately require class-wide relief to be available in certain disputes brought in 
arbitration.  
194 See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) (“[T]hings which are different in fact . . . [need not] be treated 
in law as though they were the same.”); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15–2, at 
1306–07 (2d ed. 1988); Richard A. Epstein, Gender Is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 998 (1992). 
195 Because Concepcion is limited to FAA preemption, Discover Bank remains in force with regard to class 
waivers that are not governed by the FAA.  
196Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971). 
197 See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 968 (1984); Catherine A. 
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1286–88(1991). 
198 See POST, supra note 127, at 25–26; Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 
235, 235 (1971); Law, supra note 197, at 963. 
199 See POST, supra note 127, at 14.  
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presents an especially salient context in which “innate physical differences between the sexes”200 
are such that treating men and women the same may sometimes be intolerable or, worse, 
impossible.201 For example, the Court has relied on the biological fact that only women bear 
children in order to uphold state statutes that treat unwed mothers and fathers differently when it 
comes to parental rights.202 It has also upheld the exclusion of women from such things as the 
draft and liability for statutory rape because of supposed “fundamental” and “physiological” 
differences between the sexes in matters relating to military combat and sexual predation.203  
Many feminists supported these decisions. They argued that even if the decisions rested 
on gender-based stereotypes, those stereotypes were often overwhelmingly accurate: Women do, 
in fact, take primary responsibility for the nurture and care of children (often at great sacrifice to 
their own professional advancement), and they are statistically far more likely than males to be 
victims of physical and sexual aggression.204 Some feminists also warned that by demanding 
similar treatment to men in these contexts, women would on a deeper level risk “betraying 
[them]selves and supporting what [they] find least acceptable about the male world.”205 These 
arguments reflected a growing consciousness of women’s unique and “different voice,” one 
                                                     
200 Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 862 (1979). This type of biological essentialism has frequently 
been invoked to justify excluding males from female athletic teams and vice versa in order to promote equal 
opportunity between the sexes in college athletics. See Clark, By and Through Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 
F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982) (relying on “average physiological differences”); Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n, 563 F.2d 793, 795 (6th Cir. 1977) (relying on “differences in physical characteristics and capabilities 
between the sexes”). See generally Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2009). 
201 For example, if some women but no men become pregnant, how can the sexes be considered similarly situated 
for purposes of pregnancy benefits or exclusions? And if they cannot, is it so inconsistent with the norm of equality to 
fail to treat them the same for such purposes? Or might true equality demand even more, by imposing an affirmative 
duty to treat them differently? See generally Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1985) (arguing that biological differences make it literally impossible to treat men and 
women equally in certain contexts); Law, supra note 197 (arguing that unavoidable biological differences such as 
pregnancy must be taken into account in order to achieve true equality between the sexes).  
202 The rationale is that childbirth almost always makes the woman an identifiable parent and the primary 
caretaker, whereas the father’s identity may never be discovered or he may never assume any responsibilities in child 
rearing. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979) (finding no equal protection violation in a law that 
required unmarried fathers, but not mothers, to legitimate their children as a condition for filing a wrongful death 
claim); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (finding that because men and women are “[not] in fact similarly 
situated with regard to their relationship with the child,” a statute that accorded unwed fathers fewer rights than unwed 
mothers in adoption proceedings did not violate the equal protection clause); cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 
399 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (relying on the “physical reality” and the “undeniable social reality that the unwed 
mother is always an identifiable parent and the custodian of the child” to defend a law that gave unmarried mothers (but 
not fathers) the right to block the adoption of their biological children). 
203 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76 (1981) (citing Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1981, S. 
REP. NO. 826, for the proposition that “[t]he principle that women should not intentionally and routinely engage in 
combat is fundamental, and enjoys wide support among our people”); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471 
(1981) (justifying statutory rape law’s differential treatment of men and women in part because “[o]nly women may 
become pregnant”); cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (upholding explicit restriction on hiring 
women as guards in all-male maximum security prison under Title VII BFOQ exception on the ground that “[t]he 
employee's very womanhood would . . . directly undermine her capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a 
correctional counselor's responsibility”). 
204 See Law, supra note 197, at 995–97, 1000–01.  
205 Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 151, 163 (1992). 
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grounded in an ethic of care and relationship as contrasted with a (perceived) male ethic of 
aggression and individualism.206 This consciousness, in turn, led women to envision a non-
assimilationist, “difference theory” of equality, one that did not require women to become like 
men in order to be equal to them.207  
By taking the position that arbitration and litigation are inherently different for purposes 
of class-wide relief, Concepcion traces its pedigree to something like the difference theory. From 
this perspective, it represents a more evolved state of thinking about the FAA’s antidiscrimination 
mandate because it avoids the facile presumption that arbitration and litigation must always be 
treated the same in order to be placed on an “equal footing.” But Concepcion is also problematic 
because it reifies differences that are arguably contingent and mutable. This, in turn, exposes it to 
the same critique of essentialism that has long been the Achilles’ heel of difference theory.208  
Thus, many feminists have argued that the Court’s more recent, difference-based equal 
protection cases—even those that favor women by exempting them from requirements otherwise 
applicable to men—are in truth scarcely distinguishable from paternalistic decisions from the turn 
of the century that rested on deeply suspicious stereotypes about the ‘fairer sex.’209 Clearest 
among these were early cases that restricted women’s choices in the world of work—a world 
traditionally dominated by men. In Muller v. Oregon,210 for instance, the Court upheld a statute 
making it a crime to employ women (but not men) in certain establishments for more than ten 
hours per day, even if the women wished to work longer. The rationale was that a woman’s 
“physical organization,” “maternal functions,” and role in child rearing and “the maintenance of 
the home” placed her in a position “inherent[ly] differen[t]” from that of a man.211 Only in more 
recent times would the Court come to appreciate the way that Muller and cases like it used the 
supposedly inexorable dictates of biology to legitimize arrangements that are now recognized as 
socially and historically contingent.212  
Not unlike what it did in Muller, in Concepcion the Court locates arbitration’s principal 
virtue over litigation in terms of “achiev[ing] ‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious 
                                                     
206 See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT (1982); ELIZABETH WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980). 
207 See MacKinnon, supra note 197, at 1290–93. 
208 See, e.g., Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 931–43 
(1983); MacKinnon, supra note 197, at 1287 (arguing that difference theory masks the extent to which so-called “real” 
differences are socially and legally constructed). See generally Williams, supra note 205. 
209 MacKinnon, supra note 197, at 1286–92. See generally Williams, supra note 205 (arguing that different 
treatment of men and women, even where well-intentioned, has historically resulted in the reinforcement of traditional 
gender roles). 
210 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
211 Id. at 419 n.1, 422–23. Likewise, in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872), the Court upheld a state law 
prohibiting women from becoming members of the bar. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Bradley reasoned that 
“[c]ivil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized [that] . . . . [t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman 
are to fulfil[l] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother” rather than as a lawyer.” Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
212 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (criticizing these cases as “put[ting] women, not on a 
pedestal, but in a cage”). 
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results,’”213 and professes to protect that virtue from perceived threats such as Discover Bank. But 
it is precisely the notion that arbitration has a fixed telos waiting to be discovered that is so 
dangerously susceptible to abuse. Consider Wilko v. Swan,214 a case that those who support 
Concepcion tend to consider a low point in the history of federal arbitration law. In words 
strikingly evocative of Concepcion, the Court in Wilko held that arbitration’s primary 
“advantage[]” in “secur[ing] prompt, economical and adequate” decisions made it 
correspondingly unsuited to decide weighty and complicated issues under the federal securities 
laws.215 Similarly, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,216 the Court opined that “it is the informality 
of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious 
means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less 
appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts.”217  
These status-based judgments “centered on the nature of arbitration”218 have been used 
time and again to justify invalidating broadly worded arbitration agreements.219 They also fuel the 
claims of some of arbitration’s fiercest critics: “[T]here is inherent in the institutions of private 
dispute resolution an endemic disinclination to enforce legal rights rigorously”;220 there is a “total 
lack of procedural safeguards inherent in the arbitration process”;221 “[n]ow we all know, that 
arbitrators . . . . are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of law or equity, to 
administer either effectually, in complicated cases.”222 By resurrecting similar generalizations 
about arbitration’s essence—generalizations that are likely no longer even empirically 
accurate223—Concepcion is a case study in how easily the (otherwise legitimate) concern for 
                                                     
213 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749; see also id. (stating that the “point of affording parties discretion in designing 
arbitration processes” is not to honor autonomy or freedom of contract, but rather to promote “efficient, streamlined 
procedures” (emphasis added)). The elasticity of these claims is illustrated by AT&T’s shifting positions on the matter 
during the litigation. Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 25 (arguing that “the entire point of the 
FAA is to enable parties to . . . tailor the features of arbitration, especially the procedures, to their needs), with Brief for 
Petitioners, supra note 31, at 51 (“A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve ‘streamlined proceedings 
and expeditious results.’”).  
214 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989). 
215 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. Compare this with the Court’s more modern rejection of the view that the “overriding 
goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 219 (1985); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989). 
216 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
217 Id. at 58. 
218 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009). 
219 See Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1260; supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.  
220 Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 346 (1996). 
221 Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940–41 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring), vacated, 
515 U.S. 1129 (1995). 
222 Tobey v. Cnty of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065). 
223 See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–23 
(describing the ways in which arbitration has gradually come to resemble litigation in terms of procedural complexity 
and delay—so much so that it is losing its popularity as the forum of choice for commercial disputes).  
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difference can be co-opted in ways that undermine rather than support the goal of 
nondiscrimination.224  
Concepcion’s essentialism is further problematic because it reinforces what in the gender 
context has been described as a “separate spheres ideology.”225 Men and women are so 
ineluctably different, the argument goes, that they can be equal only in their separate and 
mutually exclusive realms. The answer to man’s domination in the sphere of work or politics is 
therefore not to make woman an equal participant in the same sphere, but rather to give her 
dominion over an entirely different sphere—that of the hearth and home.226 To merge the spheres 
would so upset the essential order of things that women would stop marrying and procreating, and 
the species would face imminent extinction.227 The almost apocalyptic fear behind these 
contentions is of a piece with the fear of racial amalgamation that lies barely concealed beneath 
the surface of Plessy v. Ferguson.228 In both contexts, separateness is used to justify equality in 
form but subordination in substance.229  
This same amalgamation anxiety animates Concepcion. It is evident, for instance, in the 
Court’s suggestion that once states are permitted to make class-wide relief non-waivable in 
arbitration, it is a short step to state laws that require arbitration proceedings to incorporate jury 
fact finding or judicially monitored discovery.230 It drives AT&T’s prediction that unless 
Discover Bank were preempted as to class arbitration waivers, states could “‘chip away at [the 
FAA] by indirection,’” and thereby “kill arbitration by converting it into litigation.”231 And it is 
                                                     
224 Defenders of arbitration have rightly attacked these generalizations as either misrepresenting, misinterpreting, 
or altogether ignoring available empirical data. See, e.g., Christopher Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy, 4 Y.B. ARB. & 
MED. (forthcoming 2012); Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 161; Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? 
The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267 (2008); PETER B. RUTLEDGE, U.S. 
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ARBITRATION—A GOOD DEAL FOR CONSUMERS (2008), available at 
http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/200804ArbitrationGoodForConsumers-
Rutledge.pdf. But after Concepcion, the temptation by courts and advocacy groups to parrot these and other simplistic 
judgments about arbitration’s inherent shortcomings vis-à-vis courtroom adjudication—empirical evidence to the 
contrary notwithstanding—will become harder to resist.  
225 Williams, supra note 205, at 153–54. 
226 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Different Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, 
and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 892–93 (1993). 
227 See BETTY A. DEBERG, UNGODLY WOMEN: GENDER AND THE FIRST WAVE OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISM 53, 
57 (1990). 
228 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The 
uneasy alliance between the “separate but equal” logic of Plessy and difference-based claims in the gender context has 
been widely noted. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119–21 (1997); Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Ironies, 
Inconsistencies, and Intercollegiate Athletics: Title IX, Title VII, and Statistical Evidence of Discrimination, 1 VA. J. 
SPORTS & L. 177, 182 (1999) (arguing that by requiring separate male and female athletic teams, Title IX enforces a 
“separate but equal” framework). The connection between Plessy and Concepcion has likewise been noted. See Cliff 
Palefsky, Separate and unequal, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 14, 2011, 12:57 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/separate-and-unequal/. 
229 See MacKinnon, supra note 197, at 1289–98; Siegel, supra note 228, at 1119–20. 
230 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747–48 (2011); Transcript, supra note 88, at 38 
(Breyer, J.). 
231 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 17 (quotation omitted), 21; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 31, at 30–32. 
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latent in other recent decisions from the Court, such as Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,232 that 
seek to enforce a clear boundary between the respective provinces of arbitral and judicial 
proceedings.233  
To be sure, there are compelling policy reasons for advocating a “separate but equal” 
approach in the arbitration area in a way that does not obtain in the context of race. No matter 
what we believe (or are told by the Court to believe) about arbitration’s capacity to function as a 
surrogate for litigation in the vast majority of civil cases, there are certain undeniable 
architectural differences between the two forums—differences that make it impossible for 
arbitration to function in all the ways that a court of law can (and vice versa).234 The point is just 
that what we take to be “real” differences are not ideologically neutral but are more often than not 
self-fulfilling.235 Care must therefore be taken before using essentialism to justify exceptionalism. 
As just one example of this danger, consider the way in which the Court manages to 
exaggerate the differences between litigation and arbitration by eliding the extent to which 
collective actions are arguably just as incompatible with the former as they are with the latter.236 
For example, the rigorous requirements for class certification237 reflect a judgment that not all 
litigated cases are suitable for class-wide relief (and for exactly the same reasons of complexity, 
delay, and absent third parties that Concepcion identified in the context of arbitration).238 This 
                                                     
232 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
233 In Hall Street, the Court held that private parties could no longer contract for de novo review of arbitral 
awards by a court of law, in part because doing so “opens the door to . . . full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals,” 
which would compromise “arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.” Id. at 588 (emphasis 
added). Similarly, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010), the Court faulted a well-
respected panel of international arbitrators (Asken, G., Feinberg, K.R., Jentes, W.R.) for construing the parties’ 
arbitration agreement in light of public policy considerations—that is, for “proceed[ing] as if it had the authority of a 
common-law court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied in such a situation.” Id. at 1769 (emphasis 
added). 
234 I have previously made this very point in the arbitration context. See Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1250–54. 
Feminists have likewise argued that certain undeniably “real,” biological differences between the sexes justify treating 
men and women differently in order to achieve equality in substance. See supra notes 200–207 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra note 208. Moreover, the bare fact of difference—even a so-called “essential” difference—does not 
in itself dictate the proper legal response to that difference. This point has been made forcefully in the context of 
disability discrimination. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations 
as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 597–608 (2004). 
236 The Court has on numerous occasions declared that “[i]t is a principle of general application in Anglo-
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated 
as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process,” see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 
(1940), and that “[t]his rule is part of our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in 
court.’” Martin v. Wilks 490 U.S. 755, 726 (1989) (quotation omitted), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1072. 
Consider also that state class action rules vary widely. Some are modeled on Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (either pre- or 
post-1966 revision), but others are based on the old nineteenth century Field Code, on the Uniform Class Action Act, or 
some combination thereof. See Thomas D. Rowe, State and Foreign Class-Actions Rules and Statutes: Differences 
From—And Lessons For?—Federal Rule 23, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 147, 148–51 (2007). Some states do not even have a 
class action rule. These differences suggest a disagreement even with litigation systems about the extent to which class-
wide relief is compatible with the adjudicative process. 
237 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(3). 
238 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (describing 
“practical and insurmountable difficulties . . . . inherent” in maintaining the case at bar as a class action). 
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judgment is borne out by extant (but admittedly sparse) empirical data suggesting that well below 
half of all putative class actions are certified.239 In language reminiscent of Concepcion, scholars 
such as Martin Redish have claimed that “all class action models . . . should be rejected because 
they ignore, undermine, or dilute fundamental notions of process-based individual autonomy that 
are essential to the functioning of a civil justice system.”240 Likewise, when the 1966 revisions to 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were issued, many viewed them as doing “more 
to change the face of federal practice than any other procedural development of the twentieth 
century, including the promulgation of the Civil Rules in 1938.” 241 As in Concepcion, the fear 
was that class actions would make “litigation so complex as to be beyond the power of judicial 
tribunals to adjudicate on any rational basis.”242 By showcasing the way that class-wide relief 
conflicts with arbitration while suppressing the way in which it is likewise incompatible with 
litigation, therefore, the Court manages to invent differences that are not necessary or 
unavoidable. This, in turn, downplays the important ways in which the two adjudicative forums 
are the same and thus the reasons why they should be regulated accordingly.  
Once we commit ourselves to Concepcion’s premise that certain things commonly 
associated with litigation such as the class mechanism or the Federal Rules of Evidence frustrate 
the essence of arbitration, it seems to me we must now begin to re-evaluate many things that we 
previously took for granted. For example, the state of Illinois requires that in certain 
circumstances, the “Rules of Evidence that apply in the circuit court for placing medical opinions 
into evidence shall govern” in motor vehicle insurance coverage arbitrations.243 California deems 
                                                     
239 See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: 
What Difference Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 635 (2006) (reporting class certification rate of 22% or 
lower); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CLASS CERTIFICATION IN CALIFORNIA: SECOND 
INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 5 (2010) (reporting class certification rate 
of 22%); THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 9 (1996), available at 
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/rule23.pdf (reporting class certification rate of 37%).  
240 MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS 
ACTION LAWSUIT 90 (2009) (emphasis added); see also Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural 
Innovations in Antitrust Suits-the Twenty Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (describing 
class actions as a “de facto depriv[ation] of [defendants’] constitutional right to a trial on the merits”); cf. John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1995) 
(describing the increased acceptance of mass tort class actions as something of “a paradigm shift, signaling a 
fundamental movement away from the traditional bipolar organization of litigation to a new, more collectivized 
structure”). 
241 See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action 
Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 665–66 (1979) (emphasis added). Compare this with the Court’s recent declaration 
that class arbitration “changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented 
to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. 
Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010). 
Likewise, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, decided the very same Term as Concepcion, Justice Scalia 
acknowledged that the class action was an “‘exception’” and a “departure” from “‘the usual rule that litigation is 
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’” 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011). 
242 Am. Bar Ass’n., Report of Pound Conference Follow Up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 194 (1976); see also 
Miller, supra note 241, at 665–66. 
243 See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/143a(1) (West 2008). The same statute makes certain provisions of the 
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure relating to subpoenas and cross examination applicable to such arbitration proceedings. 
Id. at 5/143a(2)(C) & (D). 
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incorporated into every agreement to arbitrate wrongful death or injury claims “a right to take 
depositions and to obtain discovery” in the same manner and to the same extent available in a 
comparable action pending before a superior court.244 Some regulatory bodies, trade associations, 
and dispute resolution providers not only prohibit waivers of, but affirmatively require, certain 
procedural protections similar (but not identical) to what might be found in litigation, such as (a) 
a right to discovery,245 (b) a right to file a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary 
judgment,246 (c) a right of appeal to an appellate arbitration panel,247 (d) a right to peremptory and 
cause-based challenges to appointed arbitrators,248 (e) a right to permissive joinder and 
consolidation,249 and (f) a right to written, publicly available awards.250 These are all examples of 
                                                                                                                                                              
Some private dispute resolution providers also require arbitrators to follow applicable state and federal rules of 
evidence or privilege. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, R–31(c) (2009); AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, Canon II(H) (2004); INT’L INST. 
FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION RULES, R. 12.2 (2007); see also GARY B. 
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 840 (1994) (“In general, lower U.S. courts 
have assumed that privileges are unaffected either by the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”); Bruce A. McAllister & 
Amy Bloom, Evidence in Arbitration, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 35, 50–51 (2003) (“The attorney client privilege may be, 
and is often, asserted in arbitration proceedings. Arbitrators should, after in camera review of the assertedly privileged 
documents, uphold the privilege where appropriate.”); James H. Carter, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Arbitration, 
2:1 ADR CURRENTS, Winter 1996–97, at 1, 15 (“The courts have held, in the main, that arbitrators should honor legal 
privileges as would judges.”). 
244 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1283, 1283.05, 1283.1 (West 2008). 
245 See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. RULES, R. 10213 (superseded for claims filed after April 16, 2007) 
[hereinafter FINRA RULES]; id. 13500–13514; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, MINNESOTA NO-FAULT, COMPREHENSIVE OR 
COLLISION DAMAGE AUTOMOBILE INS. ARBITRATION RULES, R. 12 (2010) [hereinafter MINNESOTA NO-FAULT RULES]; 
cf. NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, princ. 13 (2011) (encouraging 
the use of discovery); TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMP’T, A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR 
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMP’T RELATIONSHIP (1995) (same).  
246 See FINRA RULES, supra note 245, R. 12504, 13504; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, NAT’L RULES FOR THE 
RESOLUTION OF EMP’T DISPUTES, R. 34(d) (1999); cf. 2005 AAA Employment LEXIS 50 (Robert T. Simmelkjaer, 
Arb.) (“[S]ince courts are empowered to grant summary judgment pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure . . . 
as well as through comparable state rules, this Tribunal is similarly authorized.”); RUAA, supra note 68, § 15(b)(2) 
(providing for summary disposition procedure).  
247 See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR THE ARBITRATION OF ANTI-DOPING 
RULE VIOLATIONS, R–45 (2009) [hereinafter ANTI-DOPING PROCEDURES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, RULES FOR 
ARBITRATION OF NO-FAULT DISPUTES IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2007) [hereinafter NEW YORK NO-FAULT RULES]; 
GREEN COFFEE ASS’N, RULES OF ARBITRATION, art. XVII, available at 
http://www.greencoffeeassociation.org/images/uploads/resources/PROFESSIONAL_RESOURCES-
Arbitration_Rules.pdf; cf. James M. Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure: The Need for a Rule 
Providing a Limited Opportunity for Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 9 (2004) 
(urging providers to adopt procedures allowing parties to obtain reconsideration of arbitral awards).  
248 FINRA RULES, supra note 245, R. 10308(d) & (f) (superseded for claims filed after April 16, 2007); id. 10311 
(same); id. 13410; NEW YORK STOCK EXCH. DEPT. OF ARBITRATION, NYSE CONSTITUTION AND ARBITRATION RULES, 
R. 609(a) & (b) (2003) [hereinafter NYSE RULES]; MINNESOTA NO-FAULT RULES, supra note 245, R. 8; NEW YORK 
NO-FAULT RULES, supra note 247. 
249 See FINRA RULES, supra note 245, R. 10314(d) (superseded for claims filed after April 16, 2007); NYSE 
RULES, supra note 248, R. 612(d). 
250 FINRA RULES, supra note 245, R. 10330 (superseded for claims filed after April 16, 2007); id. 13904(h); AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATION, R. 9, 10 (2003); ANTI-DOPING PROCEDURES, 
supra note 247, R–42; cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2008) (requiring private arbitration providers to make 
publicly available key details of arbitration award).  
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imposing litigation-like procedures in arbitration—procedures that, after Concepcion, appear just 
as incompatible with arbitration as does the class mechanism.251 Are they likewise preempted or 
otherwise displaced by the FAA?  
A similar set of questions arises when, over the objection of one side, an arbitrator relies 
on state or federal rules of evidence or procedure in a way that affects the outcome of a case.252 If 
the imposition of such rules of decision is fundamentally incompatible with the arbitration 
process after Concepcion, may the disappointed party now successfully argue for vacatur of the 
resulting award on the ground that the arbitrator has “exceed [her] powers” or violated (federal) 
public policy?253  
These are serious and viable questions in a post-Concepcion world. If rules that operate 
to ensure fairness in the default context of litigation conflict with the very definition of 
arbitration, then efforts to regulate procedural fairness in arbitration (whether by states, private 
regulatory bodies, or arbitrators themselves) that are modeled on such rules will be prone to 
attack as underhanded attempts to conform arbitration to litigation’s image. Courts will 
increasingly use FAA preemption as an excuse to exempt arbitration from rules such as Discover 
Bank while continuing to enforce those rules in the litigation context. Efforts to uphold the same 
minimum standards in both forums will thereby be stymied. This perpetuates the very 
discrimination that the Court claims it seeks to eradicate because it reinforces arbitration’s 
separate sphere—a sphere in which the usual standards of fairness do not apply (and, after 
Concepcion, cannot apply without destroying the very nature of arbitration under the FAA).  
Now consider the problem presented by the opposite of Discover Bank—laws that forbid 
rather than impose class arbitration, or that prohibit rather than require use of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Such laws would upset the contractual expectations of parties who currently 
incorporate all manner of litigation-like rules and procedures into their arbitration agreements: not 
just class-wide relief,254 but also appellate review,255 comprehensive discovery,256 the federal rules 
                                                     
251 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
252 See, e.g., Painewebber Grp., Inc. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts P’ship, 187 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1999) (describing 
arbitration panel’s compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)); 2009 AAA Employment LEXIS 240 (James Greenwood, 
III, Arb.) (applying state rules of evidence); 2009 AAA Employment LEXIS 203 (David H. Stacy, Arb.) (applying Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) to discovery dispute in arbitration); 2005 AAA Employment LEXIS 331 (G. Phillip Shuler, III, 
Arb.) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 to grant summary judgment in arbitral proceeding); 2000 AAA Employment LEXIS 
152 (William H. Ewing, Arb.) (stating that “legal rules of evidence . . . should apply in arbitration proceedings unless 
there is a very good reason for departing from them”); 1999 AAA Employment LEXIS 58 (Pamela J. White, Arb.) 
(noting that arbitrator was “guided by the Federal Rules of Evidence”); 1999 AAA Employment LEXIS 47 (Kevin B. 
Krauss, Arb.) (stating that the arbitrator used state rules of evidence and civil procedure “as a guide in processing this 
claim”). 
253 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2009); United Paperworkers Int’l v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987).  
254 See Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting stipulation by both parties to 
class arbitration); Sandra K. Partridge, Arbitration post-AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion at the American Arbitration 
Association—A Service Provider’s Perspective, 4 Y.B. ARB. & MED. (forthcoming 2012) (noting that 347 class 
arbitrations have been filed with the AAA alone since 2003, 53 of which after Stolt Nielsen).  
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of evidence257 and even the federal rules of civil procedure.258 The Court has emphasized time 
and again that “[a]rbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are 
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”259 The FAA should 
therefore preempt state laws that seek to curtail that freedom of contract. But after Concepcion, it 
is difficult to appreciate how a law that merely forbids the very things that the Court believes are 
fundamentally incompatible with arbitration’s true nature can possibly frustrate the FAA’s 
purpose.  
This second set of examples highlights the way in which the Court’s preoccupation with 
arbitration’s status belies its purported fealty to freedom of contract in matters arbitration. Just as 
Muller restricted women’s choices in the sphere of employment, so Concepcion threatens one of 
the cardinal virtues of arbitration: the freedom it affords in the design of a disputing process. 
Modern arbitration law has largely been organized around vindicating this freedom by enabling 
arbitration to become whatever the contracting parties agreed it would become—even if this 
means it might never become anything at all.260 By contrast, Concepcion returns arbitration to the 
yoke of status. It implies that an agreement audacious enough to contemplate inefficient and 
complex class procedures does not deserve the FAA’s protection.261 Freedom of contract and 
favoritism toward arbitration, in other words, are ultimately qualified—they are to be pursued 
only in the name of a particular conception of arbitration as a quick and dirty version of litigation.  
                                                                                                                                                              
255 Several arbitral providers have promulgated procedures for appealing arbitral awards to an appellate arbitral 
panel, suggesting that the practice is not unknown. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
CLAUSES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 37 (2007); JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVS. (JAMS), OPTIONAL 
ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURES 2–5 (2003); INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, ARBITRATION 
APPEAL PROCEDURE (2007). Several published court decisions have also described the use of appellate arbitration 
provisions. See, e.g., Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 982, 987 (Cal. 2003); In re Hospitality Emp’t Grp., LLC, 
234 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tex. App. 2007).  
256 See, e.g., Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (describing arbitration 
clause providing for discovery pursuant to state rules of civil procedure); Zebrasky v. Valdez, 888 N.E.2d 1130, 1131 
(Ohio App. 2008) (same); COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: STRATEGIES FOR DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING § 5.04[F][4], at 5–
48 (2012) (recommending inserting a provision for discovery in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); 
Stipanowich, supra note 75, at 383. 
257 See infra note 258.  
258 See, e.g., 2008 AAA Employment LEXIS 381 (Robert T. Simmelkjaer, Arb.) (noting that parties had agreed 
to be bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); 2002 AAA Employment 
LEXIS 150 (Chuck Miller, Arb.) (same); 2001 AAA Employment LEXIS 53 (Ellen J. Alexander, Arb.) (noting that, 
per the parties’ agreement, “[t]he arbitrator shall also apply the Federal Rules of Evidence”); Stipanowich, supra note 
75, at 383. 
Consider also that in Britain during the nineteenth century, it was not unheard of for parties to provide that their 
disputes would be heard before a panel of up to seven arbitrators, “sworn and sitting as a jury.”  COHEN, supra note 25, 
at 8 (quoting J. M. BELL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION IN SCOTLAND 14 (2d ed. 1877)). 
259 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). 
260 See id. at 478–79 (“[W]e have recognized that the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have 
not agreed to do so.”). 
261 See supra note 74. 
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B. The Touchstone of Intentional Discrimination  
My goal in the prior section was to explain Concepcion’s essentialism as a classic 
antidiscrimination move, one that nonetheless comes with significant and well-known costs that 
our experience in the gender discrimination context suggests are not worth paying. In this section, 
I seek to show that these costs did not need to be (and should not have been) paid in the first 
place.  
The Court used essentialism to answer the question of how we tell whether a facially 
neutral law “discriminates” against arbitration. It was led down this path, however, only because 
it mistakenly ended up focusing on “disproportionate impact” as the touchstone for 
discrimination262—that is, on Discover Bank’s de facto unequal treatment of arbitration and 
litigation in the way that it imposes on both forums a procedure that is fundamentally 
incompatible only with the former. This overlooks a much more compelling alternative, which 
was to focus on whether California’s context-specific unconscionability rule constituted de jure 
discrimination. Doing so would have forced the Court to make good on its own claim that 
Discover Bank exhibits the same “judicial hostility towards arbitration that prompted the FAA 
[and that] had manifested itself in ‘a great variety’ of ‘devices and formulas’ declaring arbitration 
against public policy.”263 
Hostility is not a word we associate with chance. To say that a law or employment 
practice is “hostile” toward a particular group is to say that it was motivated—however 
subliminally—by a purpose to discriminate.264 Thus, if we are to take seriously the Court’s 
longstanding position that the FAA was enacted to reverse the “old common law hostility toward 
arbitration,”265 it follows that the FAA should be construed to preempt only state laws that are 
intentionally anti-arbitration.266 This is consistent with AT&T’s framing of the preemption issue 
in terms of pretext and with the Court’s own discussion of Discover Bank and the parade of 
horribles.267 Federal arbitration law, in short, represents a purpose-based antidiscrimination 
regime.268 This interpretation is not only more faithful to the Court’s accumulated FAA 
jurisprudence, it is also more sensible from a federalism perspective. Because proving 
discriminatory purpose is exceptionally difficult, intent-based antidiscrimination regimes afford 
less protection than their effects-based counterparts.269 In the arbitration context, this means that 
                                                     
262 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011). 
263 Id. (quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959)). 
264 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 806 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “hostility” as “[a] state of enmity between 
individuals or nations” and as “[a]n act . . . displaying antagonism”; defining “hostile” as “[s]howing ill will or a desire 
to harm”). By contrast, antisubordination claims, while perhaps a response to a legacy of hostility toward certain 
groups, are not necessarily predicated on continuing hostility. Instead, they tend to be focused more on remedying the 
effects of that hostility, even where the hostility itself has largely disappeared. 
265 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); see also supra notes 109–110 and accompanying text. 
266 This, I take it, is the point behind Alan Rau’s claim that Concepcion does not prevent an arbitrator (as opposed 
to a court) from declaring class waivers unconscionable. See Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of 
Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 435, 507–09 (2011). 
267 See supra notes 107–115 and accompanying text. 
268 This is a point I have argued at length elsewhere. See Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1210–18.  
269 See Siegel, supra note 228, at 1135–1140. 
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fewer claims of discrimination against arbitration will survive, and thus that fewer state laws will 
suffer preemption.270  
By declaring that class arbitration is incompatible with arbitration’s true nature, the Court 
managed to find a colorable ground for conflict with the FAA without delving into the messier 
question of whether that conflict was haphazard or the product of improper motives. For if a state 
law can be described as striking at the essence of arbitration, it does not seem to matter much 
whether it does so through hostility or by accident. In either case, the FAA’s purposes and 
objectives would appear to be quite clearly frustrated. But notice that the reason why they are 
frustrated has now changed: It is no longer that the state law in question functions as a pretext, 
perpetuating anti-arbitration policies behind the guise of a facially neutral regulation, as AT&T 
had originally claimed. Instead, it is that the law—however well-intentioned toward arbitration—
has managed to turn arbitration into something that it plainly is not.271  
Had the requirement to prove purposeful discrimination been better appreciated by the 
litigants and the Court, it would have provided a clean and simple way to distinguish Discover 
Bank from AT&T’s parade of horribles. These hypothetical laws are problematic not because 
they just happen to produce disparate impacts on arbitration. Rather, they are problematic because 
we suspect them to be predicated on little more than knee-jerk litigation chauvinism: the bare 
assumption that only the judicial forum—or features designed for that forum or otherwise unique 
to it, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence and jury fact-finding—is adequate to resolve certain 
types of consumer claims.272  
In order to analogize Discover Bank to these examples, it would need to be fairly evident 
that Discover Bank likewise purposefully discriminates against arbitration. But even if it could be 
taken to “impose” class arbitration,273 Discover Bank does not dictate the particular form that such 
a procedure must take. It does not, for instance, require the wholesale importation of judicial class 
action rules and procedures such as Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into the 
arbitration context, and so does not betray the same type of chauvinism evident in the parade of 
horribles. The most that can be said about Discover Bank is that it mandates the availability of 
some type of class mechanism (and then only if the Concepcions could satisfy the requirements 
                                                     
270 On the current “over-preemption” of state laws by the FAA, see Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1269–85; Jill I. 
Gross, AT&T Mobility and FAA Over-Preemption, 4 Y.B. ARB. & MED. (forthcoming 2012).  
271 To be sure, the majority’s holding might be understood as a claim that Discover Bank’s attack on class 
waivers somehow represented the intentional targeting of the arbitration process itself. But AT&T offered no 
persuasive reasons to rebut the strong inference that a law that applies equally to class waivers in arbitration and 
litigation could possibly be construed as hostile only to arbitration. See supra notes 159–162 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, there are legitimate reasons for opposing class waivers (e.g., protecting consumers, policing large-scale 
wrongdoing by companies, leveling the litigation playing field) that have nothing to do with—and do not readily 
suggest—hostility toward arbitration per se. In other antidiscrimination contexts, Justice Scalia has had no problem 
making this very point to conclude that purposeful discrimination had not been established. See, e.g., Bray v. 
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270–73 (1993) (Scalia, J.). 
272 See supra notes 107–115, 176–181 and accompanying text; see also Transcript, supra note 88, at 47 (Alito, J.) 
(hypothesizing that a state might require the use of evidence rules in arbitration on the ground that they are somehow 
“necessary in order for parties to be treated fairly”).  
273 As others have pointed out, Discover Bank does not mandate anything other than the nonenforcement of class 
waivers in certain contexts. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 88, at 15–16 (Sotomayor, J.); Rau, supra note 266, 526–27; 
Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 707 
(2012). 
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for class certification). Because the parties had agreed to arbitrate before the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA), that mechanism would have conformed to the AAA’s class 
arbitration rules.274 But it did not need to. AT&T could just as well have drafted its own class 
arbitration rules, thereby protecting itself from all of the defense-side risks cited by the Court to 
defend its preemption holding. Alternatively, the arbitrator could have been entrusted to 
formulate a class arbitration procedure that stayed true to the supposed essential virtues of 
arbitration. Or the parties could have agreed on a class arbitration procedure after the fact, which 
likely would have been sufficient to protect the integrity of the process, at least from AT&T’s 
perspective.275 Absent further explanation, therefore, Discover Bank does not betray any 
necessary hostility to arbitration.  
Given these features of Discover Bank, a more appropriate comparison for the Court to 
draw would have been to (a) laws requiring the availability of some type of discovery process or 
evidentiary rules in arbitration and litigation, rather than to (b) laws requiring the availability 
specifically of judicially monitored discovery or the Federal Rules of Evidence. But it is not 
entirely clear that laws falling within category (a) are all that hostile to arbitration.276 Most 
arbitral providers allow each party some minimal discovery,277 and arbitral awards would likely 
be vacated if relevant material evidence were arbitrarily excluded.278 Moreover, because laws 
falling within category (a) impose the same generic restrictions in the litigation context, it 
suggests that they were intended to regulate the applicable process feature (discovery, evidence 
rules, etc.) rather than the particular forum in which those features are used. If Discover Bank is 
analogous to these laws, it follows from my argument that Discover Bank also does not evince the 
type of purposeful discrimination toward arbitration that the FAA was designed to reverse.  
As the party seeking preemption based on a pretext theory, AT&T bore the burden to 
rebut this conclusion—to prove that a rule that declares class waivers unconscionable to the same 
extent in arbitration as in litigation somehow purposefully discriminates only against arbitration. 
In more traditional antidiscrimination contexts, a plaintiff asserting a claim of pretext is typically 
required to prove not just that employers or state actors were aware of the consequences of their 
                                                     
274 See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 856 n.10 (9th Cir. 2009). True, the AAA modeled its rules 
after Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. But the same can be said for other rules commonly used in arbitration, such as those relating to 
discovery and appeal to an appellate arbitration panel. These rules have been in use for decades; yet nobody has 
thought to claim that they somehow change the fundamental nature of arbitration simply because they were modeled on 
a rule of court procedure. 
275 By contrast, the Court’s conclusion that class arbitration is fundamentally inconsistent with arbitration implies 
that no type of class arbitration, no matter how well tailored to the arbitral process, can get off the ground without 
vitiating the entire enterprise of FAA arbitration itself. It amounts to a ruling that the class mechanism is not a 
legitimate feature of adjudication generally, but is rather so intimately bound up with the litigation process that making 
it nonwaivable in other adjudicative forums would effectively convert those forums into litigation. 
276 This is especially so where, as here, the application of such laws is further limited to “consumer contract[s] of 
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, 
and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat 
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.” Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 
1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).  
277 See supra note 245.  
278 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2009); Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir. 
1997); RUAA, supra note 68, § 15 cmt. 1. 
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actions on protected groups but that they affirmatively intended those consequences.279 AT&T 
made nothing close to this showing, however.280 The majority should, therefore, have held that 
AT&T had failed to discharge its burden to prove discrimination, as it has been apt to do in more 
traditional discrimination contexts.281  
Instead, the majority decided the FAA preemption issue by speculating about the effect 
that class actions would have on arbitration’s essential nature, thereby relieving itself and AT&T 
from inquiring into discriminatory intention. In form, therefore, Concepcion amounts to a type of 
reasonable accommodation decision: It exempts arbitration from a neutral, generally applicable 
rule such as Discover Bank based solely on a perceived intolerable tension between the rule and 
the “essence” of arbitration.282 From the standpoint of an antidiscrimination theory of FAA 
preemption, this was the crucial mistake in Concepcion.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In a trenchant critique of the majority’s opinion, Alan Scott Rau argues that “whatever 
one can possibly spin out of all this in the way of ‘doctrine’ begins to seem increasingly 
pointless . . . . [because] we are clearly quite far here from anything that bears a recognizable 
resemblance to any neutral and informed process of adjudication.”283 By contrast, in this Article I 
have argued that Concepcion is in fact organized around a distinct logic of antidiscrimination—a 
logic that, while perhaps still unrefined and poorly understood, makes a claim to neutrality and 
principle nonetheless.  
It is time for us to take that logic seriously. For far too long, our failure to do so at both 
the practitioner and academic levels has allowed courts and litigants to exploit ambiguities and 
lacunae in our collective understanding of that logic to justify partisan, result-driven outcomes. A 
more sophisticated engagement with that logic, I argue, opens up an avenue for holding courts 
and litigants to the full implications of their own antidiscrimination-based arguments and 
holdings. This, I hope, will help place sensible limits on the FAA’s preemption of state law.  
 
                                                     
279 See supra note 102 and accompanying text; supra note 110. 
280 See supra notes 159–162 and accompanying text. 
281 Michael Dorf put this point well: “In the AT&T case, moreover, the majority opinion exhibits tension with 
another jurisprudential principle favored by Justice Scalia and other conservatives. In cases under the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, Justice Scalia and his fellow travelers have repeatedly argued against disparate 
impact tests.” Michael C. Dorf, Arbitration Decision Suggests SCOTUS Majority Are Pro-Business More Than 
Jurisprudential Conservatives, DORF ON LAW (Apr. 29, 2011, 12:42 AM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/04/arbitration-decision-suggests-scotus.html; see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 878–84 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (holding that a generally applicable law does not offend the Free Exercise Clause 
absent proof that it was intended to discriminate against religion). 
282 Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210, 217–19 (1972) (finding generally applicable law to violate the 
Free Exercise Clause because it directly conflicted with “fundamental,” “essential,” and “central” commands of the 
Amish faith).  
283 See Rau, supra note 266, at 550; see also id. at 544.  
